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HOW THE POST-FRAMING ADOPTION
OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE
STANDARD DRASTICALLY EXPANDED
GOVERNMENT ARREST AND SEARCH
POWER
THOMAS Y. DAVIES*
I
INTRODUCTION
The general theme running through most of the articles in this symposium is
that recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded police authority by
relaxing—or eviscerating—the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause”
standard for arrests and searches. I concur in that assessment: the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have pretty much destroyed the constitutional
checks against arbitrary police intrusions. However, I write to expose another,
earlier part of the story that has been almost entirely overlooked: that the nowaccepted doctrine that probable cause alone can justify a criminal arrest or
search did not emerge until well after the framing of the Bill of Rights in 1789
and constituted a significant departure from the criminal-procedure standards
that the Framers of the Bill thought they had preserved.
Framing-era common-law criminal-procedure doctrine was accusatory in
character and structured according to assessments of “necessity.” In particular,
arrest or search authority arose from, and depended upon, a foundational
accusation by a named and potentially accountable complainant that a crime
actually had been committed “in fact.” Probable cause could suffice as to the
identity of the criminal, but not for the fact of the crime. Thus, probable cause
alone regarding the commission of a crime—what I call “bare probable
cause”—was not a standard that the Framers intended to apply to criminal
arrests or searches.
Instead, the notion that bare probable cause that a crime might have been
committed suffices to justify a warrantless arrest, or issuance of an arrest
warrant, dates back only to roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. The
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notion that bare probable cause suffices to justify a criminal search warrant has
a similarly short history. Additionally, although the post-framing adoption of
bare probable cause as the standard for warrantless felony arrests increased
opportunities for peace officers to make warrantless searches of arrestees
incident to lawful arrests, the doctrine that bare probable cause could justify a
warrantless search made other than as an incident of a lawful arrest was not
invented until the 1920s. Thus, the post-framing adoption of the bare-probablecause standard by American judges was itself a drastic relaxation of the arrest
and search protections that the American Framers thought they had preserved
in constitutional provisions.
Indeed, when American judges adopted the bare-probable-cause standard,
they effectively rejected the accusatory criminal procedure that the Framers had
undertaken to preserve and instead opened the way for the development of
modern investigatory criminal procedure. In particular, the adoption of the
relaxed bare-probable-cause arrest standard facilitated the development of the
discretionary authority that characterizes modern policing and thus drastically
increased government criminal-justice power. And all this happened long
before recent Supreme Court opinions drained the modern bare-probablecause standard of significant content.
The reason this story will be unfamiliar is that the conventional history of
what is now referred to as “search and seizure” doctrine has been shaped by
bogus claims about the historical Fourth Amendment that appear in modern
Supreme Court opinions. According to that account, the Framers intended for
the first clause of the Fourth Amendment to create an across-the-board
“reasonableness” standard for all government searches and seizures. Moreover,
because “probable cause” was explicitly stated as the required justification for
particularized warrants in the second clause of the Amendment, modern
opinions have also construed bare probable cause to be the general
“touchstone” for assessing “Fourth Amendment reasonableness.”1 Thus, the
modern Supreme Court has treated bare probable cause that a crime might
have been committed as the basic Fourth Amendment standard for justifying
government arrests and searches, whether made with or without a warrant.
Indeed, modern Supreme Court opinions have even claimed that bare probable
cause has always been the general common-law arrest and search standard.
However, these judicial-chambers concoctions bear little resemblance to the
actual history of arrest and search authority. The first rule for recovering
authentic constitutional history is to discount any historical claim that appears

1. The Fourth Amendment reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The italicized first clause is now often referred to as the
“Reasonableness Clause,” while the unitalicized second clause is referred to as the “Warrant Clause.”
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in a judicial opinion. This is necessary because judicial opinions are exercises in
justification, not reports of rigorous research.2 Moreover, because “we have
always done it that way”—that is, precedent—is the most basic criterion for
legal justification, judges have routinely pretended to be merely applying prior
law when they actually departed from it and innovated—sometimes drastically.
As a result, judicial opinions regarding arrest and search law tend to bury the
actual history of doctrinal change under successive layers of fabricated myth3—
and that has also been the case with other aspects of criminal procedure.4
Indeed, this obscurantist tendency has been especially pronounced when, as
currently, judges purport to adhere to the “original meaning” of constitutional
provisions—an approach that often consists largely of creative or even arbitrary
textualism rather than significant historical inquiry.5

2. Professor Reid has nicely summed up judicial use of history:
Today a judge writing a decision in, let us suppose, a native American land case, does not say
to his clerk, “What rule does history support?” Rather, the judge tells her, “We’re going to
adopt such-and-such rule. Find me some history to support it.” It will not matter to the judge
or his colleagues on the court the quality of the historical evidence that she finds.
John Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography
of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO–AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 228 (Ellis Sandoz ed.,
1993).
3. This indictment of judicial-chambers history is based on nearly two decades of research into
historical arrest and search law. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth] (documenting that the
Fourth Amendment was originally understood only to set warrant standards, but not to create any
generalized reasonableness standard for warrantless arrests or searches); Thomas Y. Davies, The
Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002)
[hereinafter Davies, Arrest] (contrasting actual framing-era arrest law to the historical claims in recent
Supreme Court opinions); Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,”
77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Correcting History] (documenting that the law of arrest was
a salient component of “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions, rather than of the Fourth
Amendment).
4. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70
TENN. L. REV. 987 (2003) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fifth Amendment] (documenting the difference
between the original understanding of the right against compelled self-accusation and the
understanding asserted in recent Supreme Court opinions); Thomas Y. Davies, Not the “Framers’
Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Confrontation Right, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007)
[hereinafter Davies, Not the Framers’ Design] (documenting the difference between the original
understanding of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the understanding asserted in recent
Supreme Court opinions).
5. In normal usage, “original meaning” would connote the way the persons involved in the
adoption of a constitutional provision understood that text at the time of its adoption. But the justices
and commentators who identify themselves as “originalists” do not seek out the actual historical
meaning of a provision, but parse the language of the text with a historical dictionary to arrive at what
they term the “original public meaning.” In practice, the creative textualism that can be accomplished
by this method allows the “originalist” justices and commentators to impose their own preferred
meaning on the text while pretending to adhere to the “original meaning”—even though their version
bears little similarity to the historical meaning. Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out
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Moreover, until quite recently, academic constitutional histories were
overwhelmingly sycophantic and undertook merely to embellish the Supreme
Court’s judicial-chambers concoctions. As a result, the conventional academic
histories generally exhibit the same fictions as the judicial history.6 The overall
result is that our constitutional past is actually a quite foreign and only poorly
explored territory.
To get the history right, it is necessary to disregard the prochronistic7
expectations embedded in the conventional history as to how the history “must”
connect up somehow with current doctrine. Instead, it is necessary to
reconstruct the authentic past directly from the pertinent historical materials
themselves—while resisting, so far as possible, one’s own preexisting
conceptions. Then one must work forward in time while paying close attention
to indications of departures, innovations, and changes. If one does that, the
story of probable cause is fairly clear, but quite different from the story that
readers familiar with the conventional history will expect.
Indeed, the notion that the Fourth Amendment was meant to be the
primary constitutional provision to regulate arrest and search standards is itself
only a modern judicial invention. The real history is that the Fourth
Amendment was only a focused response to the then-recent controversy over
the use of general warrants for revenue searches of houses—that is, searches to
enforce customs and excise taxes. As a result, the text of the Fourth
Amendment and its reference to “unreasonable searches and seizures”—which
was a pejorative label for the gross illegality of searches and seizures made
under unparticularized, and thus unjustified, general warrants—sheds little light
on the Framers’ understanding of criminal arrest and search standards. Mere
“reasonableness” never constituted a justification for a criminal arrest or search
at the time of the framing. Likewise, the most plausible explanation why the
federal Framers adopted bare probable cause as the standard for issuing valid
warrants was that they were concerned primarily with regulating revenue search
warrants, and that was the one area where bare probable cause had emerged as
the accepted standard for issuance of search warrants.
In contrast to the modern myths, the historical record actually indicates that
the American Framers intended to preserve common-law arrest and search
standards—standards that appeared to be settled and uncontroversial during
the framing era—in the “law of the land” and “due process of law” clauses that
they included in the initial state declarations of rights and in the “due process of

Which Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the
Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 670–71 (2009).
6. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 27–28 (criticizing the conventional history of
the Fourth Amendment); id. at 39–43 (criticizing the conventional history of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause).
7. A “prochronism” is a specific form of anachronism in which aspects of a later period in time
are erroneously imposed on an earlier period. Prochronistic expectations pose a serious obstacle to
recovering accurate legal history.
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law” clause of the federal Fifth Amendment.8 Indeed, the judicial-chambers and
conventional accounts of arrest history are so defective that they virtually omit
any mention of these provisions that explicitly forbade a person being “taken”
or “arrested” except according to “the law of the land” or “due process of law.”
Yet those provisions were included in the initial American declarations of rights
more often than provisions that banned general warrants. Hence, to recover the
authentic history of arrest and search authority—and the role that bare
probable cause plays in that story—one must put aside modern Fourth
Amendment mythology.
This article undertakes to disentangle the authentic history of bare probable
cause from the judicial and conventional myths by telling the story that actually
appears in the historical sources. Part II describes the common-law arrest and
search standards that were quite consistently set out in the common-law
authorities ranging from Sir Edward Coke’s early-seventeenth-century writings
through the other leading treatises and justice-of-the-peace manuals that
Americans consulted during the framing era. It explains that common-law
criminal procedure was accusatory rather than investigatory, and that the
foundational component of the common-law standards for a warrantless arrest
or issuance of an arrest or criminal search warrant was a sworn accusation, by a
named and potentially accountable complainant (there was no such thing as a
“confidential informant”), that a crime actually had been committed “in fact”—
not mere probable cause to think a crime might have been committed. It also
explains why framing-era Americans understood that the accusatory arrest and
search standards constituted salient components of the Cokean conception of
“the law of the land” and its near synonym, “due process of law.” Because these
common-law arrest and search standards seemed well settled, the American
state and federal Framers were content to invoke them simply by using the
traditional labels, expecting (wrongly, as it would turn out) that American
judges would zealously preserve and protect those common-law standards.
Part III then explains how “probable cause” standing alone—what I call
“bare probable cause”—came to be included as the minimum justification for
issuance of a warrant in the Fourth Amendment. Bare probable cause had
emerged as a standard in English law for revenue search warrants for untaxed
or smuggled goods. The most likely explanation for this departure from the
criminal-procedure crime-in-fact requirement was that customs and excise
enforcement lacked the victim–complainants upon whom accusatory criminal
procedure usually relied. Thus, customs and excise search warrants were
necessarily issued on a revenue officer’s showing of probable cause to suspect
smuggling or tax evasion, rather than upon an accusation that a violation had
actually occurred in fact.

8. For clarity, I depart from the usual convention and use “due process of law” when referring to
the framing-era understanding and “Due Process” when referring to the broader modern meaning.
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This part also explains that the federal Framers were especially concerned
with regulating the use of warrants for customs or excise searches of houses—
but that they had conflicting interests. On the one hand, they knew that customs
and excise collections would be the primary source of revenue for the new
national government. On the other hand, they were well aware that
Parliament’s approval of the use of unparticularized “general warrants” for
customs searches of houses in the American colonies had given rise to an
important prerevolutionary grievance and also well aware that Anti-Federalists
had reignited that grievance during the ratification debates of 1787–1788 by
warning that the new Congress would authorize general warrants for revenue
searches of houses. To quiet those fears, the federal Framers definitively
banned the use of unparticularized general warrants in the Fourth Amendment.
But to avoid hamstringing federal revenue collections, the Framers adopted the
bare-probable-cause standard for search warrants that had emerged in English
revenue law, rather than the more-stringent crime-in-fact standard for commonlaw criminal warrants. Notably, however, nothing in the legislative history of
the Bill of Rights indicates that the federal Framers imagined they were
displacing the settled common-law criminal arrest and search standards when
they adopted bare probable cause as the minimum standard for issuance of
particularized warrants in the Fourth Amendment.
Part IV describes how nineteenth-century courts began to adopt bare
probable cause as a general standard for warrantless felony arrests when the
Cokean tradition of accusatory common-law standards was either lost or
rejected. The crucial innovation occurred in the early nineteenth century when
English judges, who were concerned with urban unrest and rising property
crimes, jettisoned the “felony in fact” requirement for warrantless arrests by
permitting peace officers (but not private persons) to make warrantless felony
arrests on the officer’s own assessment of probable cause that a felony might
have been committed. American state judges, who shared much the same
concerns as their English counterparts, then imported that relaxed standard for
warrantless felony arrests by peace officers around the middle of the nineteenth
century (though not without some controversy). By the end of the nineteenth
century most American jurisdictions accepted bare probable cause—
circumstances indicating that a felony might have been committed—as the
standard for warrantless felony arrests.
The importance attached to probable cause during this period seems to have
prompted courts to define the concept more precisely, and they settled on a
fairly uniform definition by the late nineteenth century; namely, that probable
cause existed when reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent
person in the belief that the person who was to be arrested had committed a
crime, or that evidence or contraband would be found in the particular place to
be searched. Notwithstanding this definition, the new bare-probable-cause
standard provided police officers with significant discretion to decide when to
make arrests, and that discretionary authority had such far-reaching effects that
it was the catalyst for the transformation of criminal procedure. Notably, it does
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not appear that American judges paid much attention to constitutional
provisions while this transformation played out. Rather, the standards for
warrantless arrests by police officers seem to have been effectively
deconstitutionalized during this period.
Part V describes how bare probable cause also took on further importance
during the early twentieth century when the Supreme Court invented what we
now call “search and seizure” doctrine by reinventing the Fourth Amendment.
In the initial Fourth Amendment cases the justices largely reconstitutionalized
the old common-law rule, rooted in the earlier Cokean conception of “the law
of the land,” that an arrest or search in a house required a criminal warrant. But
the justices did so by reading an implicit warrant requirement into the text of
the Fourth Amendment, rather than by treating that requirement as a requisite
of the “due process of law” required by the Fifth Amendment. However, the
scope of the warrant requirement became problematic when Prohibition
presented the federal courts with a need to address whether and how the Fourth
Amendment should apply to the searches of automobiles that would be
necessary if police were to be able to enforce Prohibition by seizing illegal
liquor.
As a practical matter, it was not feasible for police to obtain warrants for
searches of automobiles. But there was a doctrinal obstacle to justifying
warrantless searches of automobiles. A warrantless search for illegal liquor
could not be justified as a search made incident to a lawful arrest because
Prohibition violations were typically misdemeanors rather than felonies, but
American courts had adopted bare probable cause as a justification for only
warrantless felony arrests, not for misdemeanor arrests. With regard to
warrantless misdemeanor offenses, American courts still applied the commonlaw rule that a warrantless arrest could be made only when an officer actually
observed an on-going breach of the peace. But that standard could not be met
because the illegal liquor in automobiles was rarely in plain view when the
vehicle was stopped.
In response to this doctrinal impediment, federal judges began to read the
first clause of the Fourth Amendment as though it positively permitted any
search that could be said to be “reasonable” in the circumstances—regardless of
whether it was incident to a lawful arrest—and thus announced that warrantless
searches of automobiles for liquor were “not unreasonable”—and thus were
constitutional—so long as the searching officers had bare probable cause that a
Prohibition offense might be being committed. Notably, it was at this time that
judges began to construe the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as though it
constituted a “Reasonableness Clause” that applied independently of the
standards for valid warrants stated in the second clause.
Parts VI and VII then bring the story of bare probable cause up to the
present. Part VI discusses the rulings of the Warren Court that generally
strengthened, but sometimes undermined, regulation of police conduct. Part
VII discusses the rulings of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. It first
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identifies early Burger Court opinions that reinforced the fictional historical
pedigree ascribed to the bare-probable-cause standard, then discusses the
Burger Court’s drastic redefinition of bare probable cause as information
indicating merely a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of criminal
conduct in Illinois v. Gates9—a formulation that undercut the definition used
during the previous two-and-a-half centuries. This part also describes two other
significant relaxations of prior doctrine: the Rehnquist Court’s extension of the
minimalist notion of bare probable cause to permit warrantless arrests even for
previously nonarrestable petty offenses in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,10 and
the Roberts Court’s unanimous but truly bizarre ruling in Virginia v. Moore
that, because the Fourth Amendment requires only bare probable cause, even
an unlawful arrest for a nonarrestable offense satisfies Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness” provided that the arresting officers had bare probable cause
that some offense had been committed.11
Finally, in a brief concluding part I argue that the drastic discontinuities in
the authentic history of constitutional arrest and search standards demonstrate
that current constitutional criminal procedure bears little resemblance to that
which the Framers thought they had preserved. Hence, recent “originalist”
attempts to portray current doctrine as though it comports with the Framers’
understanding have been little more than result-driven fabrications. But I do
not argue that we should return to the actual original understanding of arrest
and search authority; far too much has changed for the authentic original
meanings of the Fifth or Fourth Amendments to answer modern issues or serve
modern needs. Instead, the primary value of recovering the actual history of
probable cause is that it illuminates the degree to which judges have expanded
government arrest and search power during the two centuries since the framing.
II
THE COMMON-LAW ARREST AND SEARCH STANDARDS THE FRAMERS
SOUGHT TO PRESERVE IN “DUE PROCESS OF LAW”
Several common misconceptions tend to get in the way of appreciating the
historical common-law standards that informed the Framers’ understanding of
criminal procedure. One is the conceit of American exceptionalism—the myth
that the American Framers created novel principles and standards in their
various declarations and bills of rights. That is not the case with arrest and
search protections. The state and federal Framers did not undertake to
formulate new arrest or search standards, but instead undertook to
constitutionalize—and thereby preserve—the arrest and search standards that
were already settled elements of the common law.12
9. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
10. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
11. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
12. A few of the rights protected in the Constitution or Bill of Rights were definitely novel (for
example, the Nonestablishment Clause), but most restated protections that had been forged in earlier
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A second misconception is that framing-era common law was too
inconsistent, inchoate, or confused to form the basis for constitutional
standards. However, at least with regard to arrest and search doctrine, the
common-law standards were set out quite consistently in the legal authorities
that shaped the Framers’ understanding. Because case reports themselves were
not widely available in America, the most influential legal authorities were the
treatises that summarized the decided cases13—especially those by Sir Edward
Coke,14 Sir Matthew Hale,15 and Serjeant William Hawkins16—and derivative
works that excerpted the more-important points in the treatises. The latter
included Richard Burn’s leading multi-volume English justice-of-the-peace
manual17 and the similar manuals, which typically borrowed heavily from
Burn’s, that were published in framing-era America,18 as well as William

English controversies. See generally, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS (Richard L.
Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). In particular, the Framers were quite conversant with earlier
English constitutional history and the language they chose for the criminal-procedure provisions in the
American declarations and bills of rights largely invoked the settled resolutions of earlier controversies.
See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 91–92 (discussing the historical origins of the “due
process of law” and “law of the land” provisions in early state declarations of rights); Davies, Original
Fourth, supra note 3, at 669–74 (discussing the origins and historical understanding of the term “law of
the land”).
13. See Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 143–44 (2005) [hereinafter Davies,
Crawford].
14. EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (four volumes, first published
1628–1644). For bibliographic information, see 1 A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 21, 258, 360, 449–52, 546 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell
eds., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter Maxwell].
15. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (two volumes, Sollum Emlyn
ed., 1736). For bibliographic information, see 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 362. Hale’s treatise was still
only in draft form when he died in 1676. 1 HALE, supra, at i n.a, xiv–xvi.
16. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (two volumes, first published
1716 & 1721) [hereinafter HAWKINS]. Several subsequent editions were published in 1771 with no
significant changes to the text. For bibliographic information, see 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 362–63.
Thomas Leach edited a 1787 edition of Hawkins’s treatise in which Leach added substantial new
material to the existing text. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(Thomas Leach ed. 1787) [hereinafter LEACH’S HAWKINS].
17. RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (1755). Multi-volume
editions of this work were published into the nineteenth century. See 1 Maxwell, supra note 14, at 225–
26; see also Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4, at 415 (discussing the prominence of Burn’s
manual). Because Burn’s manual was constantly revised during the latter half of the eighteenth century,
it is especially valuable for determining continuity or change in doctrine.
18. Four substantial justice-of-the-peace manuals were published in America between 1765 and
1789, each of which borrowed heavily from Burn’s English manual. The earliest is CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS (James Parker ed., Woodbridge, N.J., 1765). Several later editions of this manual were
published, including a 1788 edition printed in New York City by John Patterson for Robert Hodge (the
edition cited in this article), and a second, slightly different 1788 edition printed in New York City by
Hugh Gaine. The three other substantial American justice-of-the-peace manuals are AN ABRIDGMENT
OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (Joseph Greenleaf ed., Boston, 1773)
[hereinafter GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT]; RICHARD STARKE, OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (Williamsburg, Va. 1774); and SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE (Philadelphia,
1788) (attributed to John Fauchaud Grimke, Davies, Crawford, supra note 13, at 185 n.256). See also
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Blackstone’s Commentaries.19 Notably, the treatment of arrest and search
authority in these works was little changed from that which had appeared in
Coke’s writings in the early seventeenth century.20
A. The Accusatory Character of Framing-Era Common-Law Arrest and
Search Standards
Framing-era criminal-procedure doctrine was accusatory rather than
investigatory in character.21 In contrast to modern procedure, the government
was usually not authorized to investigate to discover criminal activity or even to
collect evidence for prosecutions.22 (The primary exception was the coroner’s
inquest regarding possible homicides.)23 Indeed, except when executing a
judicially issued warrant, a peace officer such as a constable generally had no
more arrest or search authority than did a private person.24 Instead, the
government usually provided only a forum for adjudicating a private
complainant’s accusation of crime, and the legal force—in the form of arrest
authority—to compel the accused’s attendance at trial. The evidence-gathering,
initiation, and prosecution of a criminal charge depended primarily on the
initiative of a named complainant who was willing to take the risks that
accompanied that role,25 namely: (1) the potential for physical resistance to an

Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 280 n.122 (providing a more-complete discussion of American justiceof-the-peace manuals).
19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (four volumes first
published 1765, 1766, 1768, 1769). To avoid prochronistic errors, the citations to Blackstone’s
Commentaries in this article are to the edition that framing-era Americans would have consulted, the
first American edition printed by Robert Bell in Philadelphia in 1771–1772. See Davies, Correcting
History, supra note 3, at 51 n.135 (discussing the importance of consulting the editions of treatises
actually used by framing-era Americans).
20. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 72–81.
21. Although historical doctrine is well preserved, we have very little information regarding actual
practice. The original understanding of the constitutional provisions dealing with criminal procedure
was shaped by the prevailing doctrine, not by the departures from doctrine that occurred in practice.
There is reason to think that actual practice always tends to shortcut doctrine to some degree.
22. It is sometimes contended, though, that the conduct of examinations of the arrestee and of
witnesses against the arrestee during Marian committal proceedings by justices of the peace were
equivalent to modern police interrogations. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)
(Scalia, J., majority opinion). The comparison is inapt in a variety of ways. See Davies, Crawford, supra
note 13, at 202–04.
23. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 271.
24. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 80–81 (“[A]s to the justifying of such Arrests by the
Constable’s own Authority; it seems difficult to find any Case, wherein a Constable is impowered to
arrest a Man for a Felony committed or attempted, in which a private Person might not as well be
justified in doing it . . . ”).
25. See, for example, the following description of criminal justice in Boston:
Through the eighteenth century the use of legal force was ordinarily a direct response to the
demands of private citizens for help. The victim of robbery or assault called a watchman, if
available, and afterward applied to a justice for a warrant and a constable to make or aid in
the arrest. The business of detection was largely a private matter, with the initiative
encouraged through a system of rewards and fines paid to informers. Neither state nor town
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arrest (which generally was lawful if the arrest was not legally justified);26 and
(2) the potential for liability for damages in a subsequent civil lawsuit for
trespass, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution if the arrestee was not
convicted of the crime for which the arrest was made. Being a complainant was
not to be taken lightly.27
Additionally, mere “reasonableness” never sufficed to justify a criminal
arrest or search in common-law procedure.28 Even probable cause that a crime
might have been or likely had been committed—the modern formulation that I
call “bare probable cause”—never sufficed to justify either a warrantless arrest
or search, or even issuance of an arrest warrant or search warrant. Rather, at
common law, an arrest or search usually was justified only if there was both (1)
a sworn accusation that a crime actually had been committed “in fact” and (2) a
sworn factual showing of at least “probable cause of suspicion” (alternatively
stated as “reasonable cause of suspicion”) as to who had committed the crime.
Of the two, the required accusation that a crime had been committed “in fact”
was the more fundamental—so much so that common-law authorities often
used the term “fact” as a synonym for the crime charged.29 “Probable cause of
suspicion,” though, applied only to the identity of culprit or the location of
stolen goods, not to the commission of the crime.
Common-law procedure was also far more focused on arrest authority than
on search authority. That was partly because, in the absence of forensic science
or possessory crimes such as drug offenses, there was little in the way of
tangible evidence to be searched for other than stolen goods. Additionally, the
focus on arrest standards reflected the degree to which arbitrary arrests, made
on order of the crown, had been a salient historical abuse of criminal-justice
power in English constitutional history.30 Perhaps in response to that historical

made any provision for the identification or pursuit of the unknown offender, except perhaps
through the coroner’s inquest.
ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822–1885 7 (1967).
26. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 625.
27. It appears that the remedy for an innocent person who was the subject of a warrantless arrest
was an action for false imprisonment, see infra note 37 and notes 189–91 and accompanying text, while
the redress for an innocent person arrested by warrant was an action for malicious prosecution, see infra
note 80. Additionally, a householder could obtain damages in a trespass action for an unlawful,
warrantless “breaking” of a house, or for an unsuccessful warrant search for stolen goods. See infra
notes 94–95 and accompanying text. Little seems to be known as to how often such damage remedies
were pursued or won.
28. Framing-era sources sometimes used the terminology of “reasonable cause of suspicion” as a
synonym for “probable cause of suspicion.”
29. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 75 (“[T]o raise a Hue and Cry, you ought to go to the
Constable of the next Town, and declare the Fact, and describe the Offender, and the Way he is gone . .
. .”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 301 (noting that the name of the township “in which the fact was
committed” must be included in an indictment). See also infra note 120 and accompanying text, and
note 176 (discussing the use of the “evidence of a fact committed” standard in several of the state bans
against general warrants).
30. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 45–47 (discussing the arrest controversies that
prompted the Petition of Right in 1628).

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

12

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:1

abuse, common-law authorities tended to assess criminal-justice authority in
terms of “necessity.”
Thus, in his 1790–1791 lectures on law in Philadelphia, James Wilson
borrowed from Blackstone in making the following statement:
Every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority, exerted, or authorized, or
encouraged by the legislature over the citizens, is wrong, and unjustifiable, and
tyrannical: for every citizen is, of right, entitled to liberty, personal as well as mental,
in the highest possible degree, which can consist with the safety and welfare of the
31
state. [We are servants of the law so we can be free.]

Likewise, Blackstone, following earlier authorities, described authority for
warrantless arrest as arising from the “necessity of the thing.”32 This necessity
criterion is readily apparent in the general restriction of criminal arrest and
search authority to instances of crimes committed “in fact,” as well as in the
usual restriction of warrantless arrest authority to only the most serious criminal
charges.
B. Warrantless-Arrest Standards
Warrantless-arrest authority was much broader for accusations of felony in
fact than for accusations of less-serious offenses.33 The reasons are apparent: It
was most important for public safety to catch and punish the potentially
dangerous criminals who committed the set of very serious and often violent
crimes denoted as felonies; and the severe punishment inflicted on a convicted
felon—often death and complete forfeiture of property—were especially likely
to prompt the accused to flee. In contrast, because there was less urgency to
arrest for less-than-felony offenses, common law permitted warrantless arrests
for nonfelony offenses only in certain situations.34
1. Warrantless Arrests for Felony Offenses
Common law provided two alternate grounds upon which a warrantless
felony arrest could be lawful. The first was an ex post justification: The arrest
was lawful if the arrestee was subsequently convicted of the felony. This actualguilt justification reflected both an earlier tradition of ex post justification and
practical reality. In the absence of an exclusionary rule, the legality of an arrest

31. 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 649 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1967) (bracketed passage
translated from Latin); cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 122 (“[E]very wanton and causeless
restraint of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is
a degree of tyranny.”).
32. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 127 (“[Authority for confining or detaining a person] may
arise either from some process of the courts of justice; or from some warrant from a legal officer having
power to commit, under his hand and seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment; or from some
other special cause warranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common law, or act of parliament;
such as the arresting of a felon by a private person without a warrant . . . .” (emphasis added)).
33. Common law defined the category of felonies more narrowly than modern criminal law. For
example, such relatively serious crimes as assaults, battery, wounding, kidnapping, or even attempts to
commit felonies were not deemed felonies. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 215–16.
34. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 321–26.
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could be tested only after the arrestee’s trial (or after the complainant failed to
prosecute), and a convicted felon was in no position to bring a trespass action.
Indeed, because there was no writ of error from a criminal conviction, and
death was a common penalty for felony, a conviction was often quite final.35
Thus, framing-era authorities usually listed the guilt (conviction) of a person
arrested for a felony as a justification of a felony arrest.36
The alternative justification for a warrantless arrest—and the justification
that was probably most important to a person considering whether to make an
arrest—was ex ante, and it applied if the arrestee was “innocent”—that is, not
actually convicted of the felony either because the arrest was dismissed, the
arresting person failed to prosecute, or the defendant was acquitted at trial. In
that case, an arrestee could test the lawfulness of the arrest in an “action”—a
lawsuit for damages—against the arresting persons.37 Under the ex ante
standard, a warrantless arrest was lawful only if (1) the arresting person could
prove a felony had been committed in fact, and (2) the arresting person could
prove information sufficient to establish “probable cause of suspicion” that the
arrestee was the suspected felon.38 Moreover, the use of Marian committal and
bail procedure (so named because it was required by statutes enacted during
the reign of Mary Tudor) meant that the arresting person needed to be
prepared to make at least a strong showing on these points immediately after an
arrest was made.39

35. There was no writ of error permitting appeal of a criminal conviction in the federal courts until
the late nineteenth century. Davies, Selective Originalism, supra note 5, at 617 n.63. During the framing
era, a motion for a new trial was usually the only form of review of a felony conviction.
36. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 631–32. This actual-guilt justification was sometimes
stated simply by referring to the validity of an arrest of a “felon”—a term that connoted a person who
had actually committed a felony. This justification has fallen into disuse and effectively disappeared
from modern doctrine. See infra note 245.
37. The damages remedy for a warrantless arrest was an action for false imprisonment, which was
usually accompanied by a claim of assault and battery. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 127, 138. If
the warrantless arrest was not immediately dismissed by the justice of the peace during the committal
proceeding, and particularly if the grand jury indicted the arrestee, it appears that the arrestee would
have had to bring an action for malicious prosecution, which appears to have been harder to win. See
infra note 80 and accompanying text.
The ex ante justification could also come into play if the arrestee killed a person who had attempted to
arrest him and he was prosecuted for homicide. Killing a constable or other person attempting a lawful
arrest was murder; if the arrest or attempted arrest would have been unlawful, though, the killing was
only manslaughter, a much less-serious crime. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 625 n.204.
38. See, e.g., 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 685 (“It is a general rule, that, at any
time, and in any place . . . if a treason or felony has been committed, [every private person] is justified
in arresting even an innocent person, upon his reasonable suspicion that by such person it has been
committed.”).
39. During the framing era, Marian committal procedure served as roughly the equivalent of the
modern Gerstein probable-cause hearing that is required to test the grounds for a warrantless arrest.
Under Marian procedure, anyone who made a felony arrest (either with or without warrant) was
required to promptly take the arrestee to a justice of the peace for the justice to decide whether to bail
the arrestee, commit him to prison, or release him. The justice was required to take and record, in
writing, the sworn information of the complainant (often called the “informer”) and any additional
witnesses the complainant could provide. In effect, this procedure put some pressure on a complainant
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Failure of proof regarding the first ex ante prong—the fact of a committed
felony—was said to be “fatal” to the lawfulness of the arrest; in that case the
arresting person was seriously exposed to trespass liability.40 In some instances
proving the fact of a felony would not have been problematic, as when a murder
victim’s body had been found. Proof of the fact of felony could be problematic
in a case of larceny, though, if the allegedly stolen property was never
recovered.41
In contrast, the second prong of the ex ante standard—reasonable or
probable cause of suspicion as to the identity of the felon—could be met in
various ways. Thus, the framing-era authorities indicated that this prong could
be shown by the “common fame of the country” (provided such fame had some
probable ground), by the person being found in circumstances that raised a
strong presumption of guilt (such as holding a knife above the body of a victim),
by the person absconding on learning he had been accused, or by the person’s
keeping company with known thieves (at least when a theft had occurred).42
However, these lists of the various grounds of probable suspicion always ended
with a caution to the effect that “generally no such cause of suspicion . . . will
justify an arrest, where in Truth no such Crime hath been committed.”43
There was also a requirement that the person making the arrest had to
personally suspect the arrestee of being the felon.44 This may sound
metaphysical, but it likely reflects the evidentiary principle that one could swear
only to what one personally knew, rather than what one had been told by

to offer prima facie, sworn proof of the guilt of the arrestee contemporaneously with the arrest. See
Davies, Crawford, supra note 13, at 126–29 (describing the accusatory criminal procedure used in the
framing era). Because the general rule was that “hearsay is no evidence,” the factual justification for
the arrest had to be provided by witnesses with personal knowledge of the events and circumstances.
See generally Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4 (describing the prominence of the ban
against hearsay in framing-era evidence doctrine).
40. See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 109, 116–17 (New York, Hodge ed. 1788) (extracting an essay by
Saunders Welch, a London High Constable, advising constables that it is “absolutely necessary” that a
felony actually have been committed if they are to justify a warrantless arrest, and that a mistake on
this point would be “fatal”). Cf. 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW 244 (1824) (“‘[W]ithout a fact suspicion is no cause of arrest;’ that is, there must be a
felony or offense, in fact, committed, and suspicion is only to the person.”); 5 id. at 588 (stating that
arrest without warrant requires proof of felony and reasonable cause of suspicion as to the person).
41. See infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 74 n.222, 84 n.257 (listing permissible
grounds found in framing-era treatises for suspicion that a person was a felon).
43. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 76; 1 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 95; 1 id. (1785 ed.), at
101–02; GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 18, at 22; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at
24–25. Each of these authorities noted that a warrantless felony arrest made on a “hue and cry” was an
exception: anyone who made an arrest based on the hue and cry was justified even if there had not
been a felony in fact, though the person who had initially raised the hue and cry would have been
accountable. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 622, n.198 (describing hue-and-cry
procedure).
44. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 76 (“[N]o Causes of Suspicion whatsoever, let the
Number and Probability of them be ever so great, will justify the Arrest of an innocent Man, by one
who is not himself induced by them to suspect him to be guilty . . . .”).
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others, because “a mere Hearsay is no Evidence.”45 Thus, it appears that the
requirement of personal suspicion meant that a complainant who initiated a
warrantless felony arrest had to be prepared to testify to direct knowledge of
the grounds for suspecting the arrestee (or perhaps be ready to present other
witnesses who could). The bottom line was that probable cause as to the
commission of a crime would not suffice; it had to be proved “in fact.” Probable
cause of suspicion was sufficient only as to the identity of the felon.
2. Warrantless Arrests for Less-than-Felony Offenses
Except for borderline felonies,46 some offenses that usually involved
“strangers” (transients who might escape unless promptly arrested),47 and a few
serious misdemeanors,48 common law generally did not allow warrantless arrests
for less than felony offenses. The primary exception was that anyone could
make a lawful warrantless arrest to stop an ongoing breach of the peace (that is,
a crime that threatened public order) such as an “affray” (a fight in a public
place) because, in that instance, prompt arrest was justified by the need to
restore the public peace. Otherwise, arrests for nonfelony offenses, including a
completed breach of the peace or other serious misdemeanor, could generally
be made only pursuant to a warrant issued by a justice of the peace.49
Additionally, because there was no urgency at all to arrest for petty offenses
or nuisances, violators were usually subject simply to a summons to appear
before the local justice of the peace (with the possibility of arrest by warrant if
the accused failed to appear).50 The principal exception was that constables had

45. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1754) (stating that
“[t]he Attestation of the Witness must be to what he knows, and not to that only which he hath heard,
for a mere Hearsay is no Evidence”). The framing-era ban against admitting hearsay as evidence was
quite rigorous and was subject to few exceptions. See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 4, at
400–08 (discussing Hawkins’ and Gilbert’s statements of the ban against hearsay evidence).
46. For example, a specific rule allowed a temporary arrest in the case of a grievous wounding to
determine whether the wound was fatal (in which case there was a felony and a warrantless arrest was
justified). See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 289 (noting warrantless arrest authority “in case
of felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to ensue”).
47. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 314–17 (discussing Hawkins’ statements that cheating
gamblers might be subject to warrantless arrest).
48. Hale had identified a few specific misdemeanors involving serious crimes (for example, leaving
“an infant in the cold to the intent to destroy it”) as being subject to warrantless arrest, but these
passages were rarely mentioned in other framing-era sources. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 308–14.
49. See, e.g., 1 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 96; 1 id. (1785 ed.) at 103:
[A] constable may ex officio arrest a breaker of the peace in his view, and keep him in his
house, or in the stocks till he can bring him before a justice.
Or any person whatsoever, if an affray be made to the breach of the king’s peace, may
without any warrant from a magistrate, restrain any of the offenders, to the end the king’s
peace may be kept; but after the affray is ended, they cannot be arrested without an express
warrant.
50. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 278–80 (discussing summary proceedings before
justices of the peace for “divers petty pecuniary mulcts [fines], and corporal penalties, . . . [and] many
disorderly offenses” as being instances in which “it is necessary to summon the party accused”); 2
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order-maintenance authority to detain public drunks and vagrants, and night
watchmen may have exercised similar authority to temporarily detain suspicious
“nightwalkers” until morning.51
C. The Absence of Warrantless Searches Other than as an Aspect of a Lawful
Warrantless Arrest
A silence—virtually no discussion of warrantless searches—in the framingera treatises and manuals reveals an important difference between historical
and modern doctrine. Indeed, except for passages on search warrants for stolen
goods, the framing-era authorities do not identify criminal search authority at
all.52 This silence does not mean, however, that there was no expectation a
person would be searched when a warrantless arrest was made. Quite the
contrary: it reflects an assumption that thieves would routinely be searched
when they were caught in the act and arrested.53 It appears that these instances
were not denoted “searches” because arrest was broadly defined to apply to any
interference with a person’s liberty to go about his business.54 Hence, it appears
that a warrantless search was justified if, but only if, a lawful warrantless arrest
could be made.55
D. Criminal Arrest Warrants
Warrants were a far more important form of criminal-justice authority
during the framing era than they are today. For example, James Wilson said in
his 1790–1791 lectures that “[a] warrant is the first step usually taken for [the
apprehension of a criminal].”56 In some instances, lawful arrests or searches
could be made only by warrant. For example, the general limitation of

WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 689–90 (“On an indictment for any crime under the
degree of treason or felony, the process proper to be first awarded, at common law, is a venire facias,
which, from the very name of it, is only in the nature of a summons to require the appearance of the
party . . . . On an indictment for felony or treason, a capias [arrest warrant] is always the first process.”).
51. Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 345–51.
52. For example, Burn’s justice-of-the-peace manual has an entry for “Search Warrant” noting that
a general warrant to search all suspected houses for felons or stolen goods is invalid. 4 BURN (1770 ed.),
supra note 17, at 104. But the rest of Burn’s discussion recognizes only the specific search warrant for
stolen goods, and the only form for a search warrant set out is for stolen goods. Id. at 105–07.
53. See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 117 (extracting from an essay by London high
constable Saunders Welch advising constables that “a thorough search of the [arrested] felon is of the
utmost consequence to your own safety and . . . by this means he will be deprived of instruments of
mischief, and evidence may probably be found on him sufficient to convict him . . . .”).
54. For example, Blackstone, using “imprisonment” as a synonym for arrest, wrote that “[e]very
confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house,
or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19,
at 127.
55. The doctrine that a lawful warrantless search could be justified in circumstances which could
not have justified a lawful warrantless arrest did not appear until the Prohibition cases of the 1920s. See
infra, part V.
56. 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 684. See also Davies, Original Fourth, supra
note 3, at 641 n.256.
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nonfelony warrantless arrests to ongoing breaches of the peace, described
above, meant that a warrant was usually the only way to make a lawful arrest
for a completed breach of the peace or other serious misdemeanor.
In addition, a criminal warrant was usually the only way to justify
“breaking” a house (that is, entering a house by closed door)57 to make an arrest
or search; hence, breaking a house without a warrant was an actionable
trespass.58 Although it has been largely overlooked in modern commentaries,
Coke had written that the requirement of a felony warrant for breaking a house
was required by Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection.59 Later authorities
continued to state the need for a criminal warrant to justify breaking a house,
but disagreed as to whether a misdemeanor warrant, or only a felony warrant,
could suffice.60
Warrant authority was also important as a practical matter even when not
strictly required to justify an arrest. In contrast to modern procedure, a
warrantless framing-era peace officer usually had no greater arrest authority
than that possessed by any private person.61 Thus, a warrant greatly enhanced
the officer’s authority. For one thing, because it was clearly unlawful to resist a
warrant arrest or search, the warrant conferred increased protection against
violent resistance. Indeed, arrest warrants sometimes took the form of
commanding a constable to accompany the private complainant and keep peace
while the complainant made the arrest.62 Additionally, a warrant largely
removed a constable’s risk of trespass liability if the arrestee was not ultimately
convicted of the offense for which he was arrested. That was so because a

57. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 226 (noting, in a discussion of burglary, that “lifting up
the latch” of an outer door would constitute “breaking” a house).
58. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 642–50 (discussing the importance attached to the
“Privilege of House” and the doctrine that “a man’s house is his castle”). The primary exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant were that a house could be entered if a peace officer perceived that violence
was then occurring inside, or if he was lawfully pursing a fleeing affrayer or felon who ran into a house.
See id. at 644. However, some authorities stated that a fleeing person could be pursued into a house
only if he was known to be a felon (actually guilty) but not if he were only under a probable suspicion
of being the felon. See id. at 645 n.269.
59. See 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 177 (stating that Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection
would be violated if a justice of the peace issued a warrant “upon surmises, for breaking the houses of
any subjects to search for felons, or stoln goods”). See also Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at
62–64 (discussing the implications of Coke’s statement, and his similar statements in Semayne’s Case, 5
Coke Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604)).
The long-unappreciated point is that Coke’s linkage between the “law of the land” protection in Magna
Carta and the requirement of a felony warrant to justify entering a house to arrest or search removes
any doubt that the Framers understood that the requirement of a warrant for breaking a house was a
fundamental principle of the common law.
60. Some authorities limited “breaking doors” of houses to felony arrest warrants. Davies, Original
Fourth, supra note 3, at 645. However, other authorities indicated that doors could be broken to
execute an arrest warrant based on an indictment for any crime (which would include serious
misdemeanors). See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 86.
61. See supra note 24.
62. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing Coke’s concept of an arrest
warrant); id. at 79 (discussing Hawkins’ concept of an arrest warrant).
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constable who only executed an arrest warrant was “indemnified” (not
immunized) by the justice of peace’s warrant.63
1. Standard for Issuing an Arrest Warrant
The framing-era standard for issuing a felony or misdemeanor arrest
warrant was essentially the same as the ex ante standard for a warrantless
felony arrest: a justice of the peace was authorized to issue a warrant if he was
satisfied that the complainant’s sworn testimony (1) established that a felony or
misdemeanor had actually been committed in fact, and (2) also provided factual
grounds constituting probable cause of suspicion as to the identity of the felon
or misdemeanant. As Blackstone put it,
[I]t is fitting [for the justice] to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as
well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without
which no warrant should be granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of
64
suspecting the party against whom the warrant is prayed.

The personal assessment of the justice of the peace regarding the fact of
crime and the grounds of suspicion as to identity were important to the
rationale for arrest warrants. Writing in the early seventeenth century, Coke
had insisted that an arrest warrant that would justify breaking a house could be
issued only after a grand jury had indicted the person to be arrested.65 But Hale
and later authorities disagreed, asserting that a justice of the peace had
authority to issue an arrest warrant upon a sworn complaint.66 According to
Hale, it was proper for a justice of the peace to issue a warrant because “the
justices . . . are made judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion, and when

63. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 288 (stating that “a lawful warrant will at all events
indemnify the officer, who executes the same ministerially”); see also infra note 78 and accompanying
text.
64. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 287 (citing 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 110) (emphasis in
original). Blackstone distinguished between instances involving a “person accused” (when the
complainant claimed actual knowledge of the identity of the felon) and “a person suspected” (when the
complainant offered to show probable cause of suspicion of the identity of the felon):
[A] justice of peace hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend a person accused of felony,
though not yet indicted . . . . [H]e may also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of
felony, though the original suspicion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant;
because he is a competent judge of the probability offered to him of such suspicion. But in
both cases it is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well to ascertain
that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without which no warrant should be
granted; as also to prove the cause and probability of suspecting the party against whom it is
prayed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
65. 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 177.
66. This was one aspect in which the law had undergone noticeable change since Coke’s time. Coke
had asserted that no arrest warrant could be issued until a person had been indicted for felony. Hale
and Hawkins disagreed as to the need for a prior indictment, and instead took the position that a justice
of the peace could issue a felony arrest warrant if there was an accusation that felony had been
committed in fact, and the identity of the felon was either known or there was reasonable cause of
suspicion as to his identity. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 62–67, 76–81. Framing-era
sources noted this conflict but clearly indicated that the position espoused by Hale and Hawkins had
carried the day. See id. at 77.

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD

19

they have examined the party accusing touching the reasons of his suspicion, if
they find the causes of suspicion to be reasonable, it is now become the justice’s
suspicion as well as theirs.”67
Hale did allow for some relaxation of the formality of an application for a
felony arrest warrant: “It is convenient, tho not always necessary, to take an
information upon oath of the person that desires the warrant, that a felony was
committed, that he doth suspect or know J.S. to be the felon; and if suspected,
then to set down the causes of his suspicion.”68 Because “convenient” meant
“proper,” “congruent,” or “in conformance with the rule” in historical usage,69
Hale’s statement connoted that the formality of recording the grounds of
suspicion should be observed unless the need for an immediate arrest of a
suspected felon was too urgent to allow the delay that would involve.
Notably, Hale’s statements regarding judicial assessment of the sufficiency
of the grounds for an arrest warrant were widely restated in the framing-era
justice-of-the-peace manuals,70 and the limited evidence available regarding
actual practice seems to confirm that a complainant seeking an arrest warrant
was required to testify under oath to the fact of a crime and the grounds for
probable cause as to the identity of the culprit prior to issuance of an arrest
warrant.71

67. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 79, 109–10.
68. 1 id. at 582. Common-law authorities often inserted initials (for example, “J.S.”) in the
quotation in the accompanying text to indicate the need to name a specific person.
Hale intended flexibility only with regard to the “set[ting] down” (writing up) of the complaint, but not
the judicial assessment of the cause, because he also wrote, in the second volume of his treatise,
But that I may say it once for all, it is fit in all cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much
more for suspicion of felony, to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well
whether a felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion, for [the justice] is in this case a
competent judge of those circumstances, that may induce granting of a warrant to arrest.
2 id. at 110.
69. See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 861 (2d ed. 1989) (including among definitions for
“convenient” the obsolete definitions “[a]ccordant, congruous, consonant (to),” “[s]uitable to the
conditions or circumstances; befitting the case; appropriate, proper, due,” and “[m]orally or ethically
suitable or becoming; proper”).
70. See, e.g., 4 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 18, at 329 (citations to Hale’s treatise omitted):
It is convenient, though not always necessary, that the party who demands the warrant be first
examined on oath, touching the whole matter whereupon the warrant is demanded, and that
examination put into writing . . . .
Lord Hale proves at large . . . that a justice hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend a
person suspected of felony, before he is indicted; and that though the original suspicion be not
in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant.
For the justices are judges of the reasonableness of the suspicion, and when they have
examined the party accusing touching the reasons of his suspicion, if they find the causes of
suspicion to be reasonable, it is now become the justice’s suspicion as well as theirs.
See also GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 18, at 372 (same language); CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 441–42 (same language).
71. Although evidence of actual practice is scarce, at least one incident from the aftermath of the
framing era indicates that a complainant’s grounds of suspicion were expected to be fully aired prior to
the issuance of an arrest warrant. During arguments in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807),
Chief Justice Marshall asked Attorney General Caesar Rodney if there would not have been an
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Serjeant Hawkins stated essentially the same standard for issuing arrest
warrants as Hale when he published his leading criminal-procedure treatise in
1721. Specifically, Hawkins wrote that a justice of the peace could justify issuing
an arrest warrant “upon strong Grounds of Suspicion for a Felony or other
Misdemeanor.”72 Notably, Hawkins also made one of the earliest attempts to
define “probable cause of suspicion” as to the identity of the criminal when he
wrote that a justice of the peace “cannot well be too tender in his Proceedings”
involving arrest warrants, and could be punished “if he grant any such Warrant
groundlessly and maliciously, without such a probable Cause, as might induce a
candid and impartial Man to suspect the Party to be guilty.”73 Hawkins’ “candid
and impartial man” formulation—which was repeated in the colonial
manuals74—would shape judicial discussions of criminal probable cause for
roughly the next two and a half centuries (though Hawkins’ “induce . . . to
suspect the party to be guilty” would later be elevated to “induce . . . to believe
the party to be guilty”).75
2. The Indemnity Provided by a Criminal Arrest Warrant
Hawkins also identified the situations in which an issued warrant did or did
not indemnify the constable who executed it. Specifically, he wrote that a
constable could not justify executing an unparticularized general arrest warrant
for unidentified persons76 or a warrant for an offense outside of the issuing
justice’s jurisdiction,77 but that otherwise a constable could justify an arrest by
warrant “whether any Felony were in Truth committed or not,” because it was
appropriate that the issuing justice alone should be answerable for issuing a
warrant in the absence of an actual crime.78 Moreover, because the constable
had no authority to question the judgment of a magistrate, Hawkins also
indicated that the warrant need not restate the grounds for suspecting the
arrestee.79

opportunity for a defendant to cross-examine his accusers during a post-arrest felony committal
proceeding. Rodney replied that a defendant would not necessarily have had that opportunity because
the court could use, in place of a further examination of the complainant’s factual allegations, the
complainant’s ex parte affidavit from the earlier proceeding at which the arrest warrant had been
issued. Id. at 124. The Attorney General of the United States apparently thought there would be a
record of the factual allegations upon which an arrest warrant had been issued.
72. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 84. Note that Hawkins’ reference to a warrant “for a Felony or
Misdemeanor” was shorthand for the crime-in-fact requirement.
73. 2 id. at 84–85.
74. See, e.g., 4 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 330; GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 18,
at 373; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 442; BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT, OR THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE 418–19 (Eliphalet Ladd ed., Dover, N.H., 2d ed. 1792).
75. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
76. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 81–82.
77. Id. at 81.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Because a warrant was a command from a justice of the peace to a constable, and the constable
had no authority to question the validity of the command in a particularized warrant, the warrant itself
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Oddly, the framing-era authorities said little about the personal liability of
the complainant who sought an arrest warrant in the case in which the arrestee
was not convicted of the crime. The reason seems to be that it would have been
difficult, as a practical matter, for an innocent arrestee to have won damages
from the complainant when an arrest had been made by warrant, because they
would have had to bring an action for malicious prosecution rather than false
imprisonment, and—in Blackstone’s words—“any probable cause . . . is
sufficient to justify the [complainant]” in an action for malicious prosecution.80
The difficulty facing the plaintiff–arrestee, of course, would have been that a
justice of the peace had already endorsed the existence of probable cause for
the arrest when he issued the arrest warrant.
E. Criminal Search Warrants for Stolen Goods
The only kind of criminal search that is discussed in the framing-era
authorities, and sometimes only in passing,81 is a search warrant for stolen
property. It appears that this warrant had a narrower application than one
might expect.
As noted above, the common-law authorities said virtually nothing about
warrantless searches. The explanation for that silence seems to be partly that
there was not much to search for (other than stolen property), and partly that it
was assumed that an arrestee would routinely be searched for weapons or
stolen goods whenever an arrest was made.82 There may have been a similar
linkage when an arrest for theft was made by warrant in a house: once the
warrant authorized entering the house, a search of the house may have been a
routine part of the arrest that was made there, at least if the arrest was for theft.
Coke’s interpretation of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision
supported the general understanding that a felony warrant was usually
necessary to justify “breaking” a house to make an arrest.83 But because the
emphasis seems to have been on the need to justify the “breaking” and entry of

did not recite the grounds for suspecting the arrestee to be the felon. See 2 id. at 85 (stating that “it
seems to be rather discretionary, than necessary to set [the grounds for suspecting] forth in any case”).
80. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 126–27. Blackstone’s discussion of the action for malicious
prosecution was very brief and appears to have been somewhat merged with his discussion of “an
action for conspiracy”—an action for malicious prosecution against two defendants who allegedly had
acted in concert in causing the false prosecution of the arrestee–plaintiff. See id. Blackstone commented
with regard to the action for conspiracy that a plaintiff would be required to produce a court record of
his indictment and acquittal, but that “in prosecutions for felony” it was usual for the courts to deny the
needed copy “where there is any, the least, probable cause to found such prosecution upon.” Id.
Otherwise prosecutors “who had a tolerable ground of suspicion” would be inhibited from prosecuting.
Id. It seems plausible that this attitude generally applied in malicious prosecution cases.
81. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 81–82, 84 (mentioning search warrants for stolen goods
only in the context of condemning unparticularized general warrants).
82. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Coke’s view of the need for a felony
warrant to justify entering a house).
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the house,84 it is possible that a felony arrest warrant for theft might have also
been understood to implicitly authorize a search for the stolen goods in the
house in which the arrest was made. Oddly, although such searches must have
occurred, the published authorities do not seem to have discussed this point.85
Notably, the discussions of search warrants in the common-law authorities
were only about the “search warrant for stolen goods” and seem to have been
directed to a setting in which an arrest warrant for theft clearly could not have
been used, namely, where the stolen property was believed to be in the
possession of someone not named as the thief—that is, either someone other
than the thief or someone whom the complainant lacked grounds to accuse of
being the thief. Indeed, the warrant forms for a search warrant for stolen
property set out in framing-era manuals recited that the felonious theft had
been committed “by some person or persons unknown,” but that there was
probable cause as to the location of the stolen goods.86 Of course, in that
situation there would not have been any basis for issuance of an arrest warrant.
Instead, it appears that justices of the peace began to issue search warrants for
stolen property as a way of permitting the victims of thefts to search houses
where there were grounds to believe the stolen property was located.87 This may

84. Like Coke, the framing-era authorities discussed the need for a criminal warrant only with
regard to “houses,” but not with regard to other premises, carriages, or elsewhere. However, there was
some ambiguity as to the meaning of “house,” which was sometimes used as simply a synonym for
“building” during the eighteenth century. For example, John Adams’ 1789 Massachusetts warrant
provision referred to a subject’s “houses” in the plural. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 115
n.362.
85. The only suggestion that has been identified in framing-era sources for the proposition that an
arrest warrant would not also justify the search of a house is a 1763 letter by Charles Pratt. See Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 647 n.277 (describing Pratt’s views on search warrants). Pratt was the
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and the judge in famous Wilkesite cases; he became Lord
Camden during the course of those cases. See id. at 563 n.21 (describing Pratt’s role in the Wilkesite
cases). But there does not seem to be any evidence that Pratt’s view was widely shared, or even widely
known.
86. The forms for a search warrant for stolen property in framing-era justice manuals typically
recited an allegation that specifically identified property had recently “by some person or persons
unknown, been feloniously taken,” and that there was probable cause as to where the goods were
located. See, e.g., GREENLEAF’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 18, at 324 (form of a search warrant);
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 384 (same). This same language still appeared at least as
late as the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–45 (1824). Although Dane
used the heading of “search warrant,” he discussed only the search warrant for stolen goods. Id.
87. In 1765, Lord Camden described the issuance of search warrants for stolen property as a
practice that had “crept into the law by imperceptible practice.” Entick v. Carrington, 11 State Trials
(Francis Hargrave ed.) 313, 321, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (C.P. 1765). Camden’s discussion in Entick
was also paraphrased in 1787 in LEACH’S HAWKINS:
His Lordship said, that warrants to search for stolen goods had crept into the law by
imperceptible practice, that it is the only case of the kind to be met with, and that the law
proceeds with great caution. For first, There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft
committed. 2dly, The owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place. 3rdly, He
must attend at the execution of the warrant to shew them to the officer, who must see that
they answer the description. And lastly, the owner must abide the event at his peril; for if the
goods are not found, He is a trespasser; and the officer being an innocent person will be
always a ready and convenient witness against him.
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have meant, however, that a search warrant for stolen property was viewed as
involving primarily the property owner’s personal interest in retrieving his
property, rather than the public interest in identifying and punishing thieves.
Moreover, because the warrant was aimed at the premises of a person who was
not accused of crime, its use called for greater restraint than the typical felony
arrest warrant.
1. The Standard for Issuing a Search Warrant for Stolen Property
The common-law authorities condemned “general warrants” to search “any
place” suspected for stolen goods long before the famous prerevolutionary,
colonial controversies over the use of general warrants for customs searches.88
These authorities also consistently stated essentially the same two-prong
standard for issuance of a search warrant for stolen property as that required to
justify a criminal arrest warrant: a search warrant for stolen property could be
issued “in case of a complaint, and oath made, of goods stolen [the felony-infact prong], and that the party suspects the goods are in such a house, and shews
the cause of his suspicion [the probable-cause-of-suspicion prong].”89 As in the
case of an arrest warrant, issuance of a search warrant for stolen goods was
characterized as a “judicial act” and thus required the magistrate’s
“examination of the fact.”90 But in contrast to felony arrest warrants, the
authorities made no allowance for shortcutting the formality of the procedure
for issuing a search warrant.91 Although a search warrant for stolen goods was
directed to a constable, the complainant (the owner of the allegedly stolen
property) was expected to attend the search to identify the stolen goods.92

2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135 n.6.
88. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 82, 84; 1 HALE, supra note 15, at 580; 2 HALE, supra
note 15, at 112, 150; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 382–83.
89. See, e.g., CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 383. This formulation tracked the one
given by Hale: That search warrants for stolen goods “are not to be granted without oath made before
the justice of a felony committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect [the
stolen goods] are in such a house or place, and do shew his reasons of such suspicion.” 2 HALE, supra
note 15, at 150. Although Hawkins did not state the standard for issuing a search warrant for stolen
property, beyond noting that it could not take the form of a general warrant, Thomas Leach added a
discussion of search warrants for stolen goods (based on Lord Camden’s statements in a recent case) in
his 1787 edition of Hawkins’ treatise. See supra note 87.
90. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 150 (stating that a search warrant for stolen goods could only be “to
search in such particular places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion and the
probable cause thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted upon examination of
the fact”).
91. As noted above, the authorities allowed some variation in the procedure for issuing a felony
arrest warrant if there was an urgent need for an immediate arrest. See supra notes 68–69 and
accompanying text (noting statements that it was “convenient” but not always necessary for the
magistrate to record the complainant’s sworn information in writing before issuing a felony arrest
warrant).
92. 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 150.
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2. The Liability Rule for a Warrant Search for Stolen Goods
As in the case of an arrest by warrant, an officer who only assisted in
executing a particularized search warrant for stolen goods was indemnified
against trespass liability.93 But the complainant who sought the warrant was
protected against liability for trespass damages only if the goods were found. If
the property was not found as alleged, the search constituted a trespass and the
complainant was liable for damages.94 The likely explanation for this strict
liability rule is that a search warrant for stolen goods served largely the
complainant’s (the theft victim’s) own private interest. Moreover, it appears
that if a peace officer acted as the complainant, he would also have been liable
for an unsuccessful search in that role.95 The probable-cause-of-suspicion prong
of the search-warrant standard was thus relevant as a criterion only for the
issuance of the warrant; the lawfulness of the search made under the warrant
ultimately depended on whether the stolen property was actually found. Hence,
even more than in the case of an arrest warrant, being the complainant for a
search warrant for stolen goods was not to be taken lightly.
F. The Framers’ Attempt to Preserve the Common-Law Arrest Standards in
“Law of the Land” and “Due Process of Law” Provisions
The common-law arrest and search standards were absorbed as the law of
the new American states when they declared their independence in 1776.
However, the Framers in most of the new states were not content to leave it at
that. Because Parliament had been the source of the prerevolutionary threats to
common-law rights, the state Framers undertook to adopt constitutional
declarations of rights that would prohibit the new state legislatures from
relaxing the settled common-law standards, including those for arrests and
searches.96 They did not undertake to restate the standards for criminal arrests

93. 2 id. at 151 (“[T]he officer is excused . . . because he searcheth by warrant.”).
94. 2 id. (“[As to the party that sought the warrant,] the breaking of the door [in execution of the
search warrant] is in eventu lawful or unlawful, viz. lawful, if the goods are there; unlawful, if not
there.”). This point was reiterated by Lord Camden in 1765. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 291–
92, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (C.P. 1765) (“[I]f the goods are not found there, [the complainant] is a
trespasser; the officer in that case is a witness.”). See also 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 135
n.6 (paraphrasing Camden’s ruling); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 383–84 (quoting
Hale). The trespass liability of the complainant for an unsuccessful search by warrant was still
recognized in early nineteenth-century American manuals. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–45 n.*.
95. This was the rule in customs and excise searches, as discussed infra notes 139, 145 and
accompanying text. In 1824 Nathan Dane included a discussion of a revenue officer’s liability for an
unsuccessful search under an excise warrant in his discussion of the liability of a complainant for an
unsuccessful search for stolen property under a criminal search warrant. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at
244–46 (“But suspicion does not always excuse the officer, especially when he informs.”).
96. The original conception of the declarations and bills of rights differed from the modern
conception in that the provisions were intended to constrain the power of the legislature, rather than to
directly regulate the conduct of government officers. During the framing era, the understanding was
that the common law regulated the officer. Moreover, the officer acted as the government only when he
acted within the lawful authority of his office; he lost that official character and became merely a
personal trespasser when he acted unlawfully. When an officer acted unlawfully, he was said to act “in
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and searches themselves, though, because the common law already did that.
Instead, they invoked the seemingly settled common-law standards by looking
back to the earlier Cokean tradition of Magna Carta’s “law of the land”
protection. In particular, that provision forbade a person being “taken” or
“imprisoned” except by “the law of the land”—the common law.
Arrests on the Crown’s orders to enforce taxes of disputed legality had been
a salient constitutional issue during the reign of Charles I in the early
seventeenth century, and the House of Commons had responded by adopting
the Petition of Right in 1628.97 During the debate on the Petition, Sir Edward
Coke argued that arbitrary arrests ordered by the Crown violated the “law of
the land” protection set out in chapter twenty-nine of Magna Carta.98 Shortly
thereafter, Coke also set out the common-law standards for lawful arrests in his
discourse on the contents of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” chapter in his
Second Institute—almost certainly the most famous of his writings.99 In that
discussion Coke also noted that an earlier English statute had used the phrase
“due processe of law” in place of “the law of the land” as a more-precise label
for common-law, pretrial, criminal-justice standards, including those for
warrantless arrest.100 Notably, from Coke’s time to the framing-era, legal
authorities used the term “due process of law” sparingly, and only as a label for
the common-law requisites of pretrial criminal procedure.101 Thus, in historical

deceit” of the government. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 255. Thus, there was no basis for
applying the constitution to unlawful conduct by officers. Rather, the point of the constitutional
provisions was to prevent the legislature from undermining the protections provided by common law;
the theory was to preserve the common law and let the common law continue to control the officer.
The modern understanding that unlawful acts by officers constitute a form of government action did
not gain acceptance until roughly the beginning of the twentieth century. See Davies, Original Fourth,
supra note 3, at 660–67 (chronicling the development of the modern doctrine of officer misconduct); see
also infra note 243.
97. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 46–47 (outlining the conflict between
Parliament and Charles I leading to the Petition of Right).
98. Although the “law of the land” chapter of Magna Carta is sometimes identified in modern
histories as chapter thirty-nine, that chapter was uniformly referred to as chapter twenty-nine in
framing-era works. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 671 n.332.
99. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 43–49, 83–86 (discussing Coke’s writings on the
subject of Magna Carta).
100. See 2 COKE, supra note 14, at 50 (stating that the statute “37 E[dward I]. 3. cap. 8” renders “the
true sense and exposition of [by the law of the land]” as “due proces[s] of law”). For a discussion of this
passage, see Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 50–52.
In historical usage, the term “process” usually referred to a written document that conferred authority
for a judicial proceeding (for example, a warrant, indictment, or writ). See id. at 81 n.244. However,
Coke asserted that “process” for arrest was not limited to “warrant in deed” (“deed” connoting a
written warrant) but also extended to “warrant in law . . . without writ” (the legal authority for
warrantless arrests recognized at common law). See id. at 53. Under the latter heading, Coke then
proceeded to set out the common-law standards for warrantless arrests as aspects of “due process of
law.” See id. at 54–62. Interestingly, Coke did not set out the standards for arrest warrants in that
chapter, but rather did so in his discussion of the office of the justice of the peace in the fourth volume
of his Institutes. See 4 COKE, supra note 14, at 176–77.
101. For example, Blackstone referred to “due process of law” only twice in the four volumes of his
Commentaries. Both instances were citations to an early statute that tracked chapter twenty-nine of
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usage the term “process” in “due process” meant the legal authority to initiate a
criminal prosecution; it was not a synonym for “procedure” (as we use it today).
Rather, in framing-era sources, fair court procedure was referred to as “due
course of law.”102
Because framing-era Americans still learned law by reading Coke’s works,
they were conversant with Coke’s then-famous discussion of Magna Carta’s
“law of the land” provision.103 Additionally, later commentators such as
Blackstone also called attention to the implications that Magna Carta’s “law of
the land” chapter held for arrest standards.104 So when the American state
Framers sought to preserve the somewhat complex common-law standards for
arrest, they invoked those standards by adopting constitutional prohibitions
against a person’s being “taken” unless according to “the law of the land.” John
Adams updated that phrasing when he drafted the 1780 Massachusetts
Declaration to say that no person was to be “arrested, imprisoned” or punished
except by “the law of the land.”105 Notably, the Framers of the initial state
constitutions and declarations of rights included these arrest prohibitions more
frequently than provisions that banned the use of general warrants.106
To make the constraint against legislative relaxation of common-law
standards even clearer, Alexander Hamilton initiated a shift from the “law of
the land” label to the more-precise terminology, “due process of law,” when
New York adopted a bill of rights in 1787.107 In keeping with Coke’s treatment, a

Magna Carta by commanding that no person was to be held for a capital trial except by “due process of
law.” Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 82–83.
102. Id. at 81–82.
103. Id. at 83–86.
104. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 130–31 (“[Englishmen are entitled to] the personal liberty of
individuals . . . . [T]he language of the great charter [Magna Carta] is, that no freeman shall be taken or
imprisoned, but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many subsequent
old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned by suggestion of petition to the
king, or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law.”).
105. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 112–13 (discussing Adams’ role in drafting the
Declaration). Adams placed this provision prior to a separate provision banning general warrants—the
provision that first introduced the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures.” See also Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 686–91 (explaining Adams’ choice of the phrase “unreasonable
searches and seizures” in his ban against general warrants).
106. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 93–127 (surveying the initial state constitutional
provisions relating to arrest and warrant standards). When George Mason produced the initial draft of
the 1776 Virginia declaration of rights (the first of the state declarations), he included an arrest
provision “that no Man, except in times of actual Invasion or Insurrection, can be imprisoned upon
Suspicion of Crimes against the State, unsupported by Legal Evidence.” Davies, Correcting History,
supra note 3, at 93–94. But Mason declined to include a provision banning general warrants because he
did not deem that to be sufficiently fundamental. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 674.
107. Although the New York Constitution of 1777 had included a “law of the land” guarantee,
radical elements of the New York legislature later asserted that, because a statute would be part of the
“laws,” the clause did not prevent them from legislatively disenfranchising former Tories. Hamilton
denounced this interpretation and quoted Coke to the effect that “law of the land” meant “due process
of law,” and asserted that the latter term clearly indicated a common-law protection that could not be
relaxed by legislation. The Hamiltonian faction then succeeded in enacting a 1787 bill of rights that,
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provision in the New York bill expressly prohibited a person’s being “arrested”
unless by “due process of law.”108
James Madison, who was in New York City in 1789, and who had also
recently collaborated with Hamilton in contributing essays for The Federalist,109
followed Hamilton’s shift when he authored the first draft for a federal bill of
rights. Thus, Madison included the “due process of law” protection among the
other requisites for the initiation of valid criminal prosecutions that he collected
in the proto–Fifth Amendment.110 Indeed, Madison’s proposed ordering for the
criminal-procedure amendments, in which he placed the proto–Fifth
Amendment first among the criminal-procedure provisions, shows that he
adhered to the understanding that “due process of law” pertained to the
requisites for the initiation of criminal proceedings, including arrest and
indictment. Next in Madison’s ordering came the proto–Eighth Amendment’s
ban against excessive bail, then the proto–Fourth Amendment’s ban against use
of general warrants, and finally the proto–Sixth Amendment’s statement of
criminal-trial rights.111
Because the federal Congress was understood to possess only enumerated
powers, rather than the plenary power of the state legislatures, it is unlikely that
the federal Framers anticipated that the federal government would engage in
general criminal-law enforcement. Hence, it is quite possible that they were less
concerned with general criminal-justice protections than the state Framers had
been. Even so, there is no reason to think the federal Framers meant to adopt
any novel understanding of “due process of law” when they framed the Fifth
Amendment in 1789.112 (Our current conceptions of procedural and substantive
“due process” are almost entirely the products of late-nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Supreme Court innovations, but that is another story.)113

among other provisions, specifically barred arrests except according to “due process of law.” Davies,
Correcting History, supra note 3, at 121–27.
108. Id. at 124.
109. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), NO.23 (Alexander Hamilton).
110. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 144–51 (explaining how the provisions in
Madison’s proto–Fifth Amendment were not miscellaneous but all related to the requisites for the
initiation of a valid criminal prosecution).
111. Id. at 140–42. The amendments were debated in the order in which Madison proposed them.
No record exists to explain why a final committee on style reordered the amendments to the final
order. Id. at 169–71.
112. See id. at 155–58 (discussing the Framers’ understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s language).
113. See id. at 197–200 (noting that the Supreme Court turned its back on the original criminalprocedure content of “due process of law” in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and then
redefined the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to serve its campaign to protect
businesses from regulation by state governments).
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III
THE ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD FOR REVENUE
SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
What, then, was the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment?
Indeed, given that bare probable cause—that is, probable cause regarding
whether a crime was committed—was insufficient to justify issuance of a
criminal warrant, why did the Framers of the Fourth Amendment simply
identify “probable cause” as the minimum standard for issuance of
constitutional warrants? The most plausible answer is that the Fourth
Amendment was actually a focused response to controversies regarding the
legality of the use of general warrants for revenue searches of houses, and the
one area of law where bare probable cause had emerged as the accepted
standard by the framing era was for revenue search warrants.
A. The Prerevolutionary General-Warrant Grievance
The conventional history of the Fourth Amendment is correct insofar as it
locates the impetus for the American constitutional provisions that set
minimum standards for the issuance of warrants in prerevolutionary
controversies regarding the legality of general warrants. There had been two
distinct lines of general-warrant controversies. In one, which involved the
English Wilksite cases of the early 1760s, the Secretary of State had issued
general warrants ordering officers to search the houses of political opponents to
discover any papers constituting evidence of seditious libel. In subsequent
lawsuits for damages brought by John Wilkes and other victims of the searches,
the English courts ruled that the general warrants were illegal and the searches
were trespasses.114
In the other line of controversies, which was the more direct basis for the
American colonial grievance against general warrants, Parliament had
authorized commissioned customs officers to use a “writ of assistance” as
authority to conduct customs searches of houses in the American colonies. As
used in the American colonies, this writ was an extreme form of
unparticularized, and thus “general” warrant. The term “general warrant”
usually referred to a warrant that authorized a search for specific fugitives or
specific stolen goods, but left to the judgment of the officer what places or
houses to search. In contrast, a writ of assistance was issued to a customs officer
when he was appointed, and it provided him with continuous authority to
search any place or house for any kind of smuggled or prohibited goods.115
There were two episodes of controversy regarding the customs writ of
assistance in America. In the first, which arose in Boston in 1761, James Otis

114. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 562–65.
115. The writ of assistance may have been used in a more limited way for customs searches in
England, but it is unclear whether Americans were familiar with that usage during the American
controversies. See infra notes 138–39.
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argued in the Writs of Assistance Case that the use of such writs was contrary to
fundamental principles of law and especially the “Privilege of House.”116 The
colonial supreme court, however, upheld the legality of the writ.117 The second,
more widespread, and more important episode arose when Parliament
reauthorized the use of the general writ of assistance for customs enforcement
in the American colonies in the 1767 Townshend Duties Act—after the English
courts had condemned the illegality of general warrants in the Wilkesite cases.
Despite the new statutory authority, colonists challenged the legality of the
general writ in a number of the colonial courts, and some of the judges refused
to issue such writs on the ground that they were “discretionary” or
“unconstitutional,” while others simply did not act on requests for issuance of
the writs.118 Hence, with the possible exception of Massachusetts (where the
1761 Writs of Assistance Case was precedent for the legality of the writ), it
appears that few searches under such writs were actually conducted. Perhaps for
that reason, the colonial general-warrant grievance had been displaced by even
more onerous grievances by the time of the Declaration of Independence.
Nevertheless, the memory of the colonial grievance still prompted the Framers
in a number of the new states to include a ban against issuance of
unparticularized general warrants among the provisions of the state
declarations of rights adopted between 1776 and 1784.119
Unsurprisingly, all of the early state provisions that addressed warrants
required that they be particularized—that is, that they identify the place(s) to
be searched and the person(s) to be arrested or thing(s) to be seized. But the
early state provisions were not uniform with regard to the appropriate standard
for assessing the justification for a search or arrest warrant. The initial warrant
provision adopted by Virginia in 1776 comported with common-law criminalwarrant standards by requiring “evidence of a fact committed,” and North
Carolina followed suit.120 The cause standards set out in later state provisions,
though, were not as specific. Maryland and Delaware required merely an “oath
or affirmation” without specifically saying what such testimony had to show.121
Pennsylvania required “oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient
foundation for [the warrant],”122 and John Adams’ Massachusetts provision
called for “the cause or foundation” for a warrant to “be . . . previously

116. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 643 (reciting John Adams’ notes of Otis’ argument
during the Writs of Assistance Case); see also id. at 642–46.
117. Id. at 561, 689–91. For an extensive treatment, see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE
CASE (1978).
118. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 566–67.
119. See id. at 674–86 (setting out the state warrant provisions that preceded the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment); see also Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 89–125 (discussing the
inclusion of law of the land or due process of law provisions and warrant provisions in the state
constitutions or declarations of rights that preceded the adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights).
120. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 100 (Virginia); id. at 103 n.319 (North Carolina).
121. Id. at 102 (Maryland); id. at 108 n.340 (Delaware).
122. Id. at 106.
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supported by oath or affirmation.”123 Notably, however, none of the state
declarations used “probable cause,” and that was also the case with the
proposals for a federal ban against general warrants made by several of the
state ratifying conventions in 1787 and 1788.124
Why this lack of specificity in the later provisions? The most likely
explanation is that the Framers in the states that had substantial port cities
(which included Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, but not Virginia or North
Carolina)125—and who thus would have been most concerned with facilitating
customs collections—had grasped the need to leave sufficient room for the
issuance of customs search warrants. Indeed, the need to allow room for
customs searches may also explain why the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
warrant provisions also included statements that defined the scope of the
protection against general warrants in terms of persons, houses, papers, and
possessions126—a formulation that is noteworthy for its implicit exclusion of
ships, and, possibly, even warehouses.127
Revenue searches differed from criminal searches in two important respects.
First, because revenue was essential to the survival of the government, and thus
an essential public good, revenue searches likely were regarded as being more

123. Id. at 114–15.
124. See id. at 131–36 (noting, for example, that Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists called for a ban
against “warrants unsupported by evidence”; that Virginia called for a ban against warrants “lacking
legal and sufficient cause”; and that New York called for a ban against warrants “without information
upon Oath or Affirmation of sufficient cause”).
125. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 681, n.369 (noting the importance of Philadelphia and
Boston as ports of entry for goods from Britain and Europe).
126. See id. at 677 (Pennsylvania warrant provision); id. at 684 (Massachusetts warrant provision).
127. Id. at 679–83. This formulation of the scope of the right was in keeping with the usual
understanding that dwelling houses enjoyed special protection at common law, but that ships did not.
Id. at 605–08. In the years immediately following the adoption of their state bans against general
warrants, both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts enacted revenue search statutes that required warrants
for searches of dwelling houses but that allowed warrantless searches of commercial premises.
For example, section 10 of a 1780 Pennsylvania impost (customs) statute provided that customs officers
had “full power and authority . . . to enter any ship or vessel, and into any house or other place where
he shall have reason to suspect [uncustomed goods] shall be concealed, and therein to search for the
same” and also provided that “in case of refusal or opposition” the customs officer could obtain a “writ
of assistance” to break doors. However, under a proviso in the next section “no search of any dwelling
shall be made in the manner aforesaid, until due cause of suspicion hath been shewn to the satisfaction
of a [magistrate], as in the case of stolen goods.” (The standard for a search warrant for stolen goods is
discussed supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.) See Act for Impost on Goods, Wares and
Merchandize imported into this State, §§ 10, 11, December 23, 1780.
A similar treatment appears in a 1783 Massachusetts “excise” statute which provided that when an
informer gave sworn written information to a customs collector of “just cause to suspect” that goods
had been improperly imported the officer was “authorized to enter . . . into the vessel or float, store,
building or place (dwelling houses excepted) and there search for the said goods” but that when an
informer had “just cause to suspect” that goods had been “put into any dwelling house” he could “give
satisfactory information thereof on oath, to a [magistrate who] may, and is hereby authorized to issue
his warrant . . . to enter such dwelling house, and there search for the said goods.” Act laying Duties of
Impost and Excise on certain Goods, Wares and Merchandize therein described, and for repealing the
several Laws heretofore made for that Purpose, July, 10, 1783. See also Davies, Original Fourth, supra
note 3, at 681 n.370; id. at 682 n.372; id. at 683.
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important than criminal searches, especially when the object of the latter was
primarily the recovery of stolen property by the individual owner.128 Second,
revenue enforcement could not rely upon victim complaints to initiate
prosecutions, as criminal justice did. Rather, revenue enforcement necessarily
depended on officers discovering violations through their own initiative (which
they were motivated to exercise by the promise of a share of the seized and
forfeited goods).129 Thus, the common-law criminal requirement of an
accusation of crime committed “in fact” was too restrictive for revenue
searches. Instead, the now-independent Americans looked back to English
revenue law for revenue search-warrant standards, and that seems to have been
the unique setting in which bare probable cause to suspect a violation had
emerged as the accepted legal standard.
B. The Emergence of Bare Probable Cause to Suspect as the English Standard
for Revenue Search Warrants
The concept of reasonable or probable cause was used in two quite different
ways in eighteenth-century English revenue statutes. The earliest use seems to
have been as a standard for a magistrate to issue a revenue search warrant to
locate untaxed goods. In that setting, “reasonable cause” referred to the
sufficiency of the factual grounds for suspecting that a revenue violation had
occurred.130 The other use, which appeared a little later, was that English
customs statutes empowered judges to issue a “certificate of probable cause” to
immunize a customs officer against damage lawsuits if the officer had made a
seizure of goods that was determined to be invalid during the subsequent
condemnation proceeding.131 Although both uses might appear to involve the

128. Jeremiah Gridley argued as much in the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case in Boston. See John
Adams, John Adams’s “Abstract,” reprinted in SMITH, supra note 117, at 548–50 (reciting that Gridley
asked rhetorically if the collection of “the Revenue” to support the army and navy were not “infinitely
more important than the imprisonment of Thieves, or even Murderers?”). Lord Mansfield made a
similar statement in 1785. See Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug. 339, 349, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916 (K.B. 1785)
(quoting Mansfield as asserting that a revenue search warrant should be more readily available to a
revenue officer than a search warrant for stolen goods should be to a private complainant because the
former was “for the benefit of the public, and it is for their benefit that the parties may proceed safely
on reasonable grounds”). Because this case report was not published until 1831, framing-era Americans
would not have been familiar with Mansfield’s post-Independence statement. Davies, Original Fourth,
supra note 3, at 561 n.19.
129. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 659 n.304 (describing the “office for profit” nature
of customs positions in colonial America).
130. See, e.g., the statutes discussed infra notes 142–44 (authorizing issuance of excise search
warrants).
131. At common law, a revenue officer who seized property found to not be in violation of the
revenue laws (property that was not condemned and thus not forfeit) was subject to a trespass action
for damages to be tried by a jury. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652 n.294. To protect the
officer, and thus encourage more aggressive revenue enforcement, Parliament made a judicially issued
certificate of “probable cause” a defense to a trespass suit for an unlawful revenue seizure. See id. at
653 n.295. This assessment was not made before a seizure (as would have been the case in assessing
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant), but afterwards, when the legality of the seizure had
been adjudicated and found invalid. Issuance of such a certificate had the effect of barring what
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same conception of “probable cause” and thus to have both contributed to the
inclusion of bare probable cause in the Fourth Amendment,132 that was not the
case. A certificate of probable cause immunized a customs officer for an
improper seizure of property133 and could be issued when the officer was judged
to have acted from an excusable mistake as to the legal interpretation of the
customs regulations.134 It does not appear, however, that a certificate of
probable cause could have been issued to protect a customs officer from a
trespass lawsuit for unlawfully searching for untaxed goods.135 So the certificate
of probable cause does not appear to be an aspect of the story of arrest or
search authority.136 Instead, the English statutory standards for issuance of

otherwise would have been a situation for a jury to assess liability and damages in the trial of the
property owner’s lawsuit.
Parliament also authorized the vice-admiralty judges in the North American colonies to grant a
certificate of probable cause as a defense against trespass suits for wrongful seizures in the 1764 Sugar
Act, a provision that prompted significant colonial protests of this displacement of the traditional role
of the jury. Because that certificate provision was also made applicable to other revenue seizures in the
American colonies, it was also understood to apply to seizures for violations of other revenue statutes,
including the hated 1765 Stamp Act. See also infra note 135.
132. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652–53, 703 n.446 (describing the different uses of
“probable cause” in historical statutes).
133. For example, the first federal customs statute, the 1789 Collections Act, provided for issuance
of a certificate of probable cause at the end of a customs condemnation procedure if the seizure was
ruled invalid but “it . . . appear[s] to the court before whom such [condemnation proceeding] shall be
tried, that there was a reasonable cause of seizure.” See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47–
48.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 311, 312–13 (1809) (holding that a customs
seizure of goods was invalid, “[b]ut as the construction of the law was liable to some question,” issuance
of a certificate of probable cause was proper). Along the same lines, the customs controversies that
preceded the American Revolution in which certificates of probable cause were issued, such as those
regarding the seizures of ships belonging to the Charleston merchant Henry Laurens, involved
hypertechnical interpretations of customs regulations rather than factual issues or searches for untaxed
goods. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 604–05.
Additionally, the term “probable cause” was sometimes used by framing-era legal authorities in
settings that involved only legal assessments, but not factual assessments. For example, Blackstone
wrote that the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus did not issue “without
shewing some probable cause” why the issuance was appropriate. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at
132. The reference to the writ of mandamus is significant because only legal, but not factual, issues
could be raised in mandamus proceedings. See id. at 111 (noting that if any factual disputes arose in
mandamus pleadings, the mandamus proceeding was ended and the petitioner had to instead file an
action for damages for filing a false return, to be tried by a jury).
135. For example, there is no mention of a certificate of probable cause in English cases regarding
the trespass liability of a revenue officer who conducted an unsuccessful search for untaxed goods. See
infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. Likewise, the certificate of probable cause provided for in
the 1789 Collections Act was specifically for “reasonable cause of seizure,” but made no mention of a
search. See supra note 133.
136. There were colonial controversies regarding the provisions for a certificate of probable cause in
revenue statutes that applied to the colonies. For example, in 1766, George Mason (who would later
draft the 1776 Virginia declaration of rights) attacked a statutory authorization for a vice-admiralty
judge to issue a certificate of probable cause, and thus bar a jury trespass trial, in a letter to British
merchants. Mason wrote that it was outrageous to give a judge who was a mere puppet of the customs
ministry the power to arbitrarily immunize an unlawful seizure by a revenue officer “by only certifying
that in [the judge’s] Opinion there was a probable Cause of Complaint.” Letter from George Mason to
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revenue search warrants are the salient source of the bare-probable-cause
warrant standard in the Fourth Amendment.
1. English Customs Search Authority
English revenue law set different standards for customs searches and excise
searches. Customs duties were collected when goods were brought into England
across its border, usually by ship. Probably because of the strong governmental
authority to enforce the border, and because ships were not entitled to any
privileged treatment at common law, English statutes simply gave “deput[ized]”
customs officers standing authority to search ships entering English waters
without requiring that they show, or even possess, grounds to suspect
smuggling.137 Additionally, English customs statutes authorized customs officers
to make searches of places on land with a writ of assistance.138 The principal
check on the use of this form of search authority was that a customs officer who
initiated a search under a writ on his own initiative, rather than on information
from another person, was himself potentially liable for trespass damages to the
owner of the premises if he did not find smuggled or prohibited goods.139
2. English Excise Search Warrants
In contrast to customs collections, which were concentrated in port cities,
English excise taxes were imposed on the production, sale, or consumption of a
wide variety of widely used goods and products throughout the country

the Committee of Merchants of London (June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 65,
67 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
137. See, e.g., 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 8 (paraphrasing 9 Geo. 2. c. 35. § 29 (1722): “Any
officer of the customs or excise (producing his warrant or deputation, if required) may go on board any
coasting vessel, and search for prohibited and uncustomed goods, and continue on board during the
vessel’s stay within the limits of the port . . . .”); id. (1785 ed.) at 7 (same). Because search warrants
were not provided for in English statutes of this period, it seems likely that the term “warrant” in this
passage simply meant the officer’s “authority”; for example, modern English police refer to their
identification as a “warrant card.”
138. Parliament conferred customs revenues on the crown at the Restoration in 1660, and shortly
thereafter created a customs search warrant. See An Act to Prevent Frauds and Concealments of his
Majesty’s Customs, 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch. 19. That search warrant provision was replaced with the writ of
assistance two years later. See An Act to Prevent Frauds, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2., ch. 11, § 5, sched. 2); see
also SMITH, supra note 117, at 41–50. The entry on “power to search” in the discussion of customs in
the 1770 and 1785 editions of Burn’s justice of the peace manual mentions the “writ of assistance out of
the exchequer.” 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 6; 2 id. (1785 ed.) at 5.
There is evidence that searches conducted by revenue officers under a writ of assistance in England,
unlike in the North American colonies, were often based, in practice, on information regarding a
specific violation, though it does not appear that colonial Americans were aware of this during the
colonial controversies. See SMITH, supra note 117, at 511–15 (providing an account of American
confusion over the writs from contemporary letters).
139. See, e.g., Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils. 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770) (imposing trespass liability
on a customs officer who, pursuant to a writ of assistance, made an unsuccessful search on his own
initiative rather than on information from another person). Framing-era Americans likely were familiar
with Bruce because it was first published in 1775. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 652 n.294.
Note, however, that this decision post-dated the American colonial controversies of the 1760s regarding
the use of the writ of assistance for customs searches.
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(including, for example, liquor, beer, ale, cider, coffee, tea, salt, soap, sugar,
vinegar, linen, candles, and starch). Because these taxes often applied to small
producers, excise enforcement exposed houses to revenue searches to a far
greater degree than customs searches did. Perhaps for that reason, the statutory
standards for excise searches distinguished between commercial premises and
houses. The statutes often provided that commercial premises where taxed
products were made or sold were to be “ent[e]red” (registered) at the local
excise office and that excise officers could search those commercial premises
without warrant.140 In contrast, and in keeping with the special status accorded
the house, the statutes provided for issuance of excise search warrants for
searches in other places such as houses.141
Additionally, the statutory standards for issuing excise search warrants seem
to have become more stringent during the early eighteenth century. An excise
statute regarding various cloths, enacted in 1711, authorized the issuance of a
search warrant on an oath by a credible informer that he had reason to suspect
that untaxed cloth was concealed; but this statute did not explicitly require
either that the informer set out the grounds of suspicion or that the magistrate
assess the sufficiency of those grounds before issuing the warrant.142 However,
beginning with the reign of George I, statutory excise-search-warrant provisions
required that the officer state under oath the grounds for suspecting the
location of concealed goods, and also provided that a magistrate was authorized
to issue a “special” (specific) search warrant if the magistrate “shall judge it
reasonable.”143 Thus these statutes seem to have called for the magistrate to
assess the officer’s showing of reasonable cause before granting a warrant.

140. See, e.g., 2 BURN (1770 ed.), supra note 17, at 34 (stating that with regard to ale or beer, any
brewer had to give notice (register) with the local excise office and that an officer of excise was
empowered to break the door of any brewhouse “where he shall have just suspicion” that the excise
was being violated by illegal production).
141. For example, in 1763 William Pitt was decrying the danger that excise officers would enter
private residences and violate the sanctity of the house to levy the tax on cider when he famously
declared in Parliament that “[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the
rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of that
ruined tenement.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378–79 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 15
HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1753–1765 1307).
142. An excise statute pertaining to silk, linen, and other fabrics that was enacted during the reign of
Queen Anne, simply provided that justices “may” issue a search warrant on an oath by a credible
person that “he, she, or they have reason to suspect or believe” the whereabouts of untaxed goods, but
did not explicitly require either that the person state the grounds of suspicion, or that the magistrate
assess the sufficiency of the grounds. An Act for Laying Several Duties Upon All Sope and Paper, 10
Ann., c. 19, § 98 (1711).
143. For example, the search warrant provision in the 1765 excise statute for candles stated the
following:
[I]n case any Officer . . . shall have cause to suspect that Soap or Candles . . . are privately
making in any place . . . or that any Soap or Candles . . . are lodged or concealed . . . with
Intent to defraud his Majesty of his Duty; then . . . upon oath made by such Officer before the
Commissioners [of excise] . . . or before one or more Justice [of the peace] . . . setting forth the
Ground of his [suspicion] . . . it shall and may be lawful for said Commissioner or . . . Justice . .
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3. The English Liability Rule Regarding Unsuccessful Revenue Searches
The English rule at the time of American independence (when English
common law was absorbed into American law) was that an excise search
warrant did not automatically indemnify an excise officer for an unsuccessful
search. Rather, in the 1773 Court of Common Pleas ruling in Bostock v.
Saunders,144 the judges equated the statutory standard of “reasonable cause”
with “probable cause” and ruled that an officer who obtained a search warrant
on his own initiative was liable for trespass damages of £100 when he made an
unsuccessful search of a house for untaxed goods, and did not show “probable
cause or ground of suspicion” for the search to the satisfaction of the jury in the
subsequent trespass action.145 William Blackstone, who was among the judges,

. if he or they shall judge it reasonable, by Special Warrant . . . to authorize and empower such
Officer . . . to enter into all and every such Place [suspected] . . . and to seize and carry away
all such Soap or Candles . . .
Customs and Exise Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 43, § 20 (1765) (emphasis added). Similar provisions stating an
explicit requirement that the grounds of suspicion be set out, and that the magistrate find the grounds
“reasonable” before issuing an excise search warrant appeared in excise statutes as early as the reign of
George I. See, e.g., 10 Geo. 1, c. 10, § 13 (1723) (coffee, tea, chocolate); 11 Geo. 1, c. 30, § 2 (1724) (rum
and spirits); 23 Geo. 2, c. 21, § 34 (1750) (soap, candles, and starch).
144. There are two reports of the 1773 decision. The earliest was Bostock v. Saunders, 2 Wils. (1st
ed., Part 3, titled “Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Common Pleas,” 1775),
reprinted 2 id. (2d ed. 1784) 434, reprinted 3 id. (3rd ed. 1799) 434, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141. Because the
pagination is consistent in all three editions, I cite only the most readily available third edition in
subsequent notes. The other report, published in 1781, was by William Blackstone, who was one of the
judges in the case. Bostock v. Saunders, 2 Bl. 912, 96 Eng. Rep. 539. Blackstone’s report was also
paraphrased in some detail in the entry on excise in the 1785 edition of Burn’s manual. See 2 BURN
(1785 ed.), supra note 17, at 69–71. As a result, Bostock was readily accessible by Americans during the
framing era.
145. Bostock, 3 Wils. (3d ed. 1799) at 440–41, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1144–45 (opinion of Chief Justice de
Grey). See also id. at 441, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145 (opinion of Justice Gould that the officer could not
justify under the warrant but, though no goods were found, it might have been justified if he showed “a
probable cause” for the search); id. at 442, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1146 (opinion of Justice Nares that the
officer was required to prove “probable cause or ground of suspicion” for the search). However, the
term “probable cause” does not appear in the report of the judges’ views in the other case report of
Bostock by Blackstone. See 2 Bl. at 913–16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 539–40.
There was uncertainty as to whether the commissioners of excise had actually assessed the grounds for
the excise search warrant, issued under 10 Geo. 1, c. 10, § 13 (1723) (discussed supra note 143).
Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that the warrant had been issued merely on the officer’s conclusory claim of
probable cause. See 3 Wils. at 436, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1142. Perhaps to deflect future claims against the
commissioners, Chief Justice de Grey asserted that under this statutory provision “the commissioners
were bound to grant the warrant on oath of [the officer].” 3 id. at 440, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145. In
contrast, Justices Gould and Blackstone suggested that the commissioners might be liable if they issued
a warrant without an adequate showing of cause, but declined to actually rule on that point. 3 id. at
441, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145–46. Justice Nares stated the commissioners had “a discretionary power to
grant such a warrant.” 3 id. at 442, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1146. Notwithstanding these differences, the justices
all agreed that an officer who initiated an excise search warrant was liable for trespass damages if the
search was unsuccessful and he failed to prove adequate cause to the jury. Chief Justice de Grey
analogized an officer-informer’s liability to that of the complainant for an unsuccessful search under a
search warrant for stolen goods. 3 id. at 440, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1145.
Bostock’s liability rule was overruled in 1785 by the Court of King’s Bench, which instead held that an
excise officer who had failed to find untaxed goods while executing a warrant obtained on his own oath
was nevertheless protected against trespass liability. See Cooper v. Booth, 3 Esp. 135, 143–46, 170 Eng.
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gave the opinion that, although “the law reposes a confidence that [magistrates]
will not wantonly authorize the officers to enter the houses of the subject, . . .
still, if the suspicion, tho’ plausible, appears to be ill founded; the officer, who,
by a false and mistaken suggestion, hath obtained such licence from the
commissioners, shall personally answer for the injury.”146 Apparently, a
“plausible” suspicion was not enough to justify the unsuccessful warrant search.
C. The American Adoption of Bare Probable Cause as the Standard for
Revenue Search Warrants
The American political elite seem to have viewed revenue collections in a
new light when the revenues were funding American governments rather than
that in London, especially because the huge debt incurred during the
Revolutionary War presented a pressing need to obtain revenue for the new
national government. However, the need for effective revenue collection was
counterbalanced by the memory of the colonial general warrant grievance. To
accommodate both concerns, Americans seem to have looked to the recent
English excise statutes as a workable compromise—that is, they accepted the
use of a warrant to authorize a search of a house if, but only if a magistrate
concluded that an excise officer had shown “reasonable” or “probable cause” of
an excise violation.
Although this bare-probable-cause standard was laxer than the common-law
crime-in-fact standard for a criminal warrant, the magistrate’s assessment
nevertheless offered far more protection against arbitrary revenue searches
than the general writ or general warrant had. In particular, a revenue search
warrant based on a judicial assessment of bare probable cause did not bestow
discretion on the revenue officer himself—but neither would it stifle revenue
enforcement the way the crime-in-fact requirement for a criminal warrant
would have. In addition, a revenue warrant did not immunize the officer who
obtained it; rather, American law seems to have absorbed the ruling in Bostock
that a revenue officer who conducted an unsuccessful search under a revenue
search warrant was liable for trespass damages if he could not show “probable
cause” for the search to the satisfaction of a jury.147

Rep. 564, 567–68 (K.B. 1785). However, it is highly unlikely that Americans were familiar with Cooper
when the Fourth Amendment was framed or ratified because this case report was not published prior
to 1801, Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 561 n.19, and the only other report of the case,
Cooper v. Booth, 4 Dougl. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785), was not published until 1831. Thus,
framing-era Americans would have been familiar only with the ruling in Bostock. Indeed, Cooper was
not even well known in England at the time of the framing of the American Bill of Rights because the
1797 edition of Burn’s manual still set out the same discussion of Bostock as had appeared in the earlier
1785 edition, without mentioning Cooper. See 2 BURN (1785 ed.), supra note 17, at 69–71; 2 id. (1797
ed.) at 91–93.
146. Bostock, 2 Bl. at 915–16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 540 (opinion of Blackstone, J.); see also 2 BURN (1785
ed.), supra note 17, at 71 (paraphrasing opinion of Blackstone, J., as reported in Bostock, 2 Bl. at 915–
16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 540).
147. See 7 DANE, supra note 40, at 244–46 (citing the reports of Bostock as authority that “suspicion
does not always excuse the officer [executing a search warrant], especially when he informs” and that
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The appeal of this compromise standard for revenue warrants is evident in
American legislation adopted in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War.
Shortly after the end of the war, there was an attempt to create customs
revenue for the new national government. In 1786, Pennsylvania enacted a
statute that accepted the national scheme but with the proviso that its
acceptance
shall not be construed . . . to enable any officer or other person to break open any
dwelling house without probable cause for so doing be shewn on oath, or solemn
affirmation, to some Justice of the Supreme Court or to some Justice of the Peace, and
148
his warrant, directed to a Peace Officer, first obtained.

Note that the requirement that probable cause “be shewn on oath” would
seem to require the officer to set out the factual grounds for probable cause.
Controversy over revenue searches of houses was reignited during the
ratification debates of 1787–1788. Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of
the new constitution frequently warned that the new federal government would
exact ruinous taxes, and they embellished those alarms by invoking the memory
of the prerevolutionary general-warrant grievance.149 In particular, they warned
that the new federal Congress would be so eager to collect taxes—especially
excise taxes, which would be collected throughout the country—that it would
authorize the use of general warrants for revenue searches and thereby expose
every house to invasion by “excisemen.” Notably, the fears about search
authority expressed in the debates were almost exclusively about revenue
searches of houses—especially excise searches of houses under general
warrants.150
In particular, the agitation regarding the potential for federal general excise
search warrants does not seem to have extended to criminal arrest or search
warrants. The two areas of law were quite distinct, and revenue violations
generally did not result in criminal prosecutions. Instead, the usual sanction for
a violation of the revenue law was the seizure of the untaxed goods which were
then declared forfeit in a civil proceeding. Indeed, there were so few
expressions of concern about the potential for general criminal warrants during
the 1787 and 1788 debates that it could not have been more than a marginal
aspect of the agitation that prompted the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.151

“where an excise officer informed and got a search-warrant to search for excised goods in A’s house
and found none in it[,] [t]he court held, the officer was liable in an action of trespass, and that on the
trial he must show the grounds of his suspicion,” and that “the same construction ought to be given of
our [American] impost and excise laws in like cases”).
148. Session Laws of Pennsylvania, Act of April 8, 1786, ch. 30, § 3 (emphasis added).
149. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 609–10, 721–22.
150. Id. at 609–11.
151. The two expressions of concern about criminal general warrants that have been identified are a
statement by Patrick Henry during the Virginia ratification convention and another by Abraham
Holmes during the Massachusetts convention. See id. at 609 n.162. When Henry lamented the absence
of a federal ban against general warrants, he expressed a concern that, if a person were to be arrested
under such a general warrant, it might occur “many hundreds of miles from the judges” and thus it
would be more cumbersome for the arrested person to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in America than
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D. The Bare-Probable-Cause Standard in the Fourth Amendment
To quiet the fears that the new national government would authorize the
use of general warrants for revenue searches, the First Congress included a ban
against issuance of general warrants among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The narrow focus of the provision that we know as the Fourth Amendment is
quite evident if one considers the actual legislative history of the text.
1. Madison’s Initial Draft
James Madison, who had experience in drafting revenue statutes, was
undoubtedly familiar with both the English revenue statutes and the 1786
Pennsylvania statute when he drafted the proto–Fourth Amendment as part of
his larger proposal for a federal bill of rights.152 Unsurprisingly, he adopted the
bare-probable-cause standard when he proposed the proto–Fourth
Amendment:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
153
seized.

Perhaps because there was general recognition of the importance of revenue
enforcement,154 it does not appear that Madison’s choice of the bare-probablecause standard prompted any debate or controversy. The committee that
initially reviewed Madison’s draft accepted the substance of his proto–Fourth
Amendment and made only one change that was more than stylistic;
specifically, the committee narrowed the scope of the protection by changing
Madison’s “other property” to “effects”155—a term that appears to have been

would be the situation in England. (Habeas corpus could be issued only by high court judges at that
time.) Interestingly, Henry’s apparent assumption that a writ of habeas corpus would provide a remedy
for the arrest implied that he thought that a general arrest warrant would be deemed to be illegal once
it could be brought to the attention of “the judges.” See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 588 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1838). Holmes argued that the new federal Congress should be prohibited, like the Massachusetts
legislature already was, from “authoriz[ing] judicial authority to issue a[n arrest] warrant against a man
for a crime, unless his being guilty of the crime was supported by oath or affirmation, prior to the
warrant being granted.” See 2 id. at 111–12.
152. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 703 (noting Madison’s authorship of a Virginia
customs statute).
153. Id. at 697.
154. The concern that the Bill of Rights not impede revenue collection may also account for the
inclusion of the limitation “in any criminal case” in the self-accusation clause of the proto–Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 705 n.450; Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1015–17 (noting that
the proponent of that addition was the primary drafter of the 1789 Collections Act and speculating that
he was concerned the self-accusation provision not apply to the oaths involved in customs regulations).
155. The committee proposal was,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, [against
unreasonable searches and seizures,] shall not be violated by warrants issuing, without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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understood to refer primarily to moveable property of the sort found in houses,
such as furniture, but could also include a merchant’s goods.156 Of course,
Madison’s single-clause format, which the committee did not alter, was clearly
focused only on banning general warrants.157 Indeed, his use of the collective
term “the people” probably also reflected the focused ban against general
warrants because such warrants, being unparticularized, threatened the security
of the entire community.158
2. The Final Change that Produced the Two-Clause Text
The only other change made to Madison’s single-clause text was a lastminute amendment during the final House debate that substituted “and no
warrant shall issue” in place of Madison’s “by warrants issuing.” That change
had the effect of altering Madison’s single-clause format to a two-clause
provision,159 and adherents of the conventional account of Fourth Amendment
history—although conceding that Madison’s single-clause draft had been aimed
only at banning general warrants160—claim that this final change was made for
the purpose of creating a broad “reasonableness” standard.161 However, that is
pure myth.

See, e.g., Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 166 n.521. The bracketed phrase, “against
unreasonable searches and seizures,” was actually omitted from the committee report—apparently by
accident—but was reinserted at the beginning of the House debate on the provision. Id.
156. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 706–11 (discussing changes from “possessions” to
“other property” to “effects” in the formulations of the scope of the ban against general warrants); id.
at 708 nn.461–62 (discussing the use of the term “effects” in framing-era legal sources). See also, e.g., 1
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining
“effect” as “8. In the plural, effects are goods; moveables; personal estate. The people escaped from the
town with their effects.”); Henry Laurens, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Court of ViceAdmiralty (Pamphlet, Charleston, 1769), reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763–
1776 206 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1967) (stating that because of oppressive customs regulations, merchants
“will be induced to draw their effects out of trade as much as possible”).
157. Madison’s focus on banning general warrants in the proto–Fourth Amendment was also
evident from the fact that he described that provision as a ban against “general warrants” in his speech
introducing his proposals for a Bill of Rights in the House. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at
699 n.435 (listing contemporary sources providing evidence for Madison’s intent). Madison’s innovation
in using a single-clause format for the ban against general warrants appears to simply reflect his stylistic
dislike of the right-therefore-rule formulation of the earlier state provisions. Id. at 697–99.
158. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 161–64 (arguing that Madison’s choice of
individual or collective terminology when stating various rights reflected the nature of the right under
discussion, and particularly noting the collective nature of the “right of the people” preserved in the
Assembly and Petition Clause of the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, and the Fourth
Amendment, as contrasted to the individual formulations of the Third Amendment, Fifth Amendment,
and Sixth Amendment).
159. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 716–19.
160. Nearly all of the conventional commentators have conceded that Madison’s draft had clearly
been aimed only at banning too-loose warrants. See id. at 699 n.434 (listing sources).
161. See id. at 568–70 (discussing the formulation of the conventional account and noting the
numerous commentaries and opinions that have cited and followed that formulation). See also infra
note 257 and accompanying text (discussing the invention of the conventional history in a 1937
monograph publishing a 1934 Ph.D. dissertation).
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The only recorded objection to the single-clause draft was that it was merely
“declaratory,” and all the final change to “and no warrant shall issue” actually
did was to insert the explicit command that had been included in all of the
earlier state bans against general warrants—namely, that a noncomplying
warrant “ought not be granted.”162 Thus, although the last-minute change did
produce a two-clause text, it was merely a by-product of the change, not its
purpose.163 There is not so much as a scintilla of a suggestion in the legislative
history that any member of the First Congress thought that the change created a
novel “reasonableness” standard for all federal searches.164 Likewise, there is no
indication that anyone interpreted the Fourth Amendment that way either in
the immediate aftermath of the framing or during the following century.165
Contrary to the conventional history, there is not a shred of historical support
for the modern myth that the Framers intended for the Fourth Amendment to
create any overall “reasonableness” standard for assessing all government
intrusions.166
E. The Bare-Probable-Cause Standard in Early Revenue Search-Warrant
Provisions
The record of the first several Congresses confirms the degree to which the
federal Framers were concerned with revenue searches rather than criminal
searches, but it also suggests that they may have had different attitudes toward
customs and excise searches because the latter posed the greater danger to the
security of houses. The first customs statute, the 1789 Collections Act (enacted
shortly before the First Congress adopted the Bill of Rights), set different
standards for customs searches of ships and places on land. With regard to

162. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 719–22 (discussing the objection to the declaratory
character of “by warrants issuing”). Comparable commands had been included in all of the previous
state warrant provisions as well as in the proposals for a ban against general warrants made by state
ratification conventions. Id.
163. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 32–38, 166–69.
164. Because there is no record of any debate on the motion to substitute “and no warrant shall
issue,” it does not appear that anyone present thought the change did anything novel. The conventional
history is simply implausible when it asserts that a change as novel and fundamental as the creation of
an overarching “reasonableness” standard for all government searches could have been made without
prompting debate.
165. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 611–19 (noting that in the aftermath of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights neither federal nor state cases attributed a broad “reasonableness”
standard to the Fourth Amendment or to the state warrant provisions that also used the phrase
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that early constitutional commentators such as Justice
Joseph Story also did not mention any “reasonableness” standard when discussing the Fourth
Amendment, but simply treated that amendment as having banned the use of general warrants).
166. Because of the understanding of the division of power between the federal and state
governments in 1789, it is implausible that the federal Framers anticipated that the federal government
would be as generally involved in criminal law enforcement as the states. Hence, it is likely the federal
Framers were thinking primarily about customs searches rather than criminal warrants when they
adopted the text of the Fourth Amendment (especially since they had previously approved the Fifth
Amendment’s provision that no person be denied of life, liberty, or property—the three forms of
criminal punishments—except by “due process of law”).
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ships, customs officers were authorized to make a warrantless search of “any
ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares, or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.”167 But the statute recognized
the need for a search warrant for places on land and provided as follows:
If [the officer] shall have cause to suspect a concealment [of uncustomed goods], in
any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, [he] shall, upon
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant
to enter such house, store or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for
168
such goods . . . .

It is unclear whether this provision was understood to require the officer to
set out the factual grounds for his suspicion or merely to swear, in a conclusory
fashion, that he possessed “cause to suspect” the location of smuggled goods.169
If the statute was understood to require merely the latter, that understanding
likely would have rested on a continuing acceptance of the doctrine that a
revenue officer was liable for damages in a subsequent trespass action if he
obtained and executed a revenue search warrant but found no untaxed goods
and later could not prove adequate cause for the search to the satisfaction of a
jury.170
The provisions of the 1791 Hamilton Excise Act, which applied to distilled
liquor, set different search standards for commercial premises and houses. Like
the English excise statutes, it required that distilleries be registered with the
excise office and provided that excise officers could inspect those commercial
premises at will during the daytime.171 However, and perhaps because of public
fears regarding widespread excise searches of houses,172 the excise-search
provision regarding houses not only required use of a search warrant, but also
provided that the “special warrant or warrants” could be issued only “upon
reasonable cause of suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction [of the issuing
judge or justice of the peace].”173 Thus, like the later English excise statutes, the
1791 Act explicitly called for judicial assessment of the adequacy of the officer’s
showing of “reasonable suspicion.”

167. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
168. Id.
169. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 711 n.470 (discussing differing interpretations of
the search warrant provision). Unfortunately, there is a gap in the legislative record regarding the
search-warrant provision. Id.
170. See supra note 145 (discussing the 1773 English ruling in Bostock); see also supra note 147
(discussing the applicability of the Bostock ruling to American customs searches).
The 1789 Collections Act did not prohibit trespass actions against an officer who obtained a search
warrant: instead, it anticipated that trespass actions could be brought against the officer who initiated a
search warrant but extended some indirect protection to customs officers, such as by providing for
double costs to be awarded against a plaintiff who unsuccessfully sued a customs officer regarding a
seizure. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat. 29, 43–44.
171. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 26, 29, 1 Stat. 199, 205–07.
172. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 712 n.471 (discussing Congressional opposition to
the Act).
173. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. at 207. In this provision, “special” was used as a
synonym for “specific”; thus, a “special warrant” meant a particularized warrant.
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In contrast to these revenue search provisions, the early Congresses did not
adopt any statutory provisions regarding criminal arrests or searches. Rather,
the 1789 Judiciary Act implicitly adopted existing state common-law arrestwarrant and search-warrant standards when it directed federal judges and
marshals to use the “usual mode of process” in the state in which a federal court
sat.174 Indeed, the Congress never addressed the warrantless arrest authority of
federal officers until 1935.175 Thus, because the early Congresses never
attempted to apply the bare-probable-cause standard to criminal arrests or
searches, it is implausible that the use of that standard in the Fourth
Amendment was meant to do anything more than set a minimum standard that
would accommodate federal revenue search warrants.176
IV
THE POST-FRAMING ADOPTION OF BARE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND THE INVENTION OF INVESTIGATORY CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
How, then, did bare probable cause come to be viewed as the general
standard for criminal arrests and searches? The answer is that things did not
develop as the Framers expected. The Cokean tradition of “due process of law”
was lost (or rejected) during the nineteenth century, and the law of arrest was
essentially deconstitutionalized. During this hiatus, state judges (not the
legislatures, which the Framers had feared) enlarged the warrantless arrest
authority of police officers to such a degree that the government gained
174. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (providing authority for any judge or justice
of the peace to order arrest of a violator of federal law “agreeably to the usual mode of process” of the
state). As noted above, “process” still referred to the form of authority for an arrest or search and
would have included arrest warrants or search warrants. Of course, because the usual mode of process
for a warrant or arrest in a state would have had to comply with the state constitutional standard, this
approach would seem to have indirectly required that federal arrests and searches comply with the state
“law of the land” or “due process of law” protections regarding criminal arrests.
175. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. A 1792 statute did provide that the federal
“marshals of the several districts and their deputies shall have the same powers in executing the laws of
the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states.” Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 18, § 9, 1
Stat. 264, 265. Several judicial opinions and commentaries have misinterpreted this provision as though
its purpose were to confer warrantless arrest authority on federal marshals. However, that was not the
case. Indeed, as of 1792 state sheriffs had no special warrantless arrest authority beyond that possessed
by any private person. See supra note 24. Instead, the 1792 provision was actually part of a “Militia Bill”
and its apparent purpose was to authorize federal marshals to raise the posse commitatus of the county
to put down a riot or insurrection if the local sheriff failed or refused to do so. That concern seems to
have been based on fears of the potential for armed resistance to the 1791 excise (as actually occurred
during the Whiskey Rebellion). For a more detailed discussion of this statute and its misinterpretation,
see Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 157 n.491; Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 355–56;
Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 611 n.171.
176. Perhaps because the bare-probable-cause standard was associated with revenue warrants rather
than criminal warrants, state warrant provisions adopted after the framing of the bill of rights did not
always copy the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard; instead, Tennessee and Illinois still
followed the earlier Virginia formulation of “evidence of a fact committed,” while Ohio adopted the
oxymoronic standard of “probable evidence of the fact committed.” Davies, Original Fourth, supra
note 3, at 704 n.449.

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD

43

drastically expanded investigatory powers. The result was that criminal
procedure was fundamentally transformed.
A. The Initial Persistence of Common-Law Arrest Standards in the Aftermath
of the Framing Era
The common-law arrest standards described in part II were still evident in
the immediate aftermath of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. For example,
when James Wilson gave his 1790–1791 lectures in law in Philadelphia, he still
included the felony-in-fact criterion for a warrantless arrest:
It is a general rule, that, at any time, and in any place, every private person is justified
in arresting a traitor or felon; and, if a treason or felony has been committed, he is
justified in arresting even an innocent person, upon his reasonable suspicion that by
177
such person it has been committed.

This same rule was also endorsed two decades later in Wakely v. Hart, a
widely cited Pennsylvania arrest case that arose from a warrantless arrest for
theft.178 The court stated that “even when there is only probable cause of
suspicion, a private person may without warrant at his peril make an arrest [but]
nothing short of proving the felony will justify the arrest.”179 Because there was
no proof of a theft in fact, the court upheld a trespass judgment against a high
constable who had assisted in making the arrest,180 and thus followed the
framing-era rule that a peace officer possessed no greater felony warrantlessarrest authority than a private person.181 The fundamental requirement of a
felony in fact was still noted when Nathan Dane surveyed American arrest law
in 1824.182 Additionally, on the few occasions when state courts referred to
constitutional provisions in discussions of arrest standards during this period,
they still looked to the “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions,
rather than to the state provisions banning general warrants.183
177. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 31, at 685 (emphasis added). Note that Wilson’s
reference to the arrest of “a traitor or felon” reflected the actual guilt justification of a warrantless
felony arrest, while his qualification of “if a treason or felony has been committed” reflected the felonyin-fact prong of the “on suspicion” justification.
178. 6 Pa. 315 (1814).
179. Id. at 318.
180. Id. at 318–19.
181. See supra note 24.
182. 5 DANE, supra note 40, at 588 (1824) (summarizing the 1796 trespass and false imprisonment
ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Gale v. Hoyt as “to justify one man’s arresting
another, without warrant or legal process, there must be, 1. Proof that a felony has been committed: and
2. A reasonable cause to suspect the person arrested, has committed the felony”).
183. For example, when the New Hampshire Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of a
statute that provided arrest authority for the offense of unnecessarily travelling on the Sabbath, the
judges looked to the state “law of the land” provision—which they described as “a literal translation
from Magna Carta c. 29” and characterized it as a “due process of law” provision—rather than to the
state general warrant provision, which, like that of Massachusetts, referred to a right against
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” See Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 55, 60 (1817). But the court in
Mayo, after stating the common-law standards, nevertheless ignored those standards and approved a
novel statutory grant of arrest authority as being within the legislative power. Id. at 57–59; see also
Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 120–21 (summarizing the court’s ruling in Mayo). For later
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But all of that was about to change. For one thing, legal education changed
during the early nineteenth century as American lawyers put aside Coke’s
Institutes and instead read Blackstone’s Commentaries—although the latter
gave only a superficial treatment of criminal procedure and arrest law.184 For
another, in the absence of an American legal-publishing industry, the American
bench and bar remained reliant upon English treatises and cases under the
rubric of a shared “common law”185—and English judges were about to
drastically depart from the prior common law of arrest.
B. The Invention and Importation of Bare Probable Cause as the Standard for
Warrantless Felony Arrests
Starting in 1780—after American independence—English judges responded
to increasing urban crime and disorder by altering criminal-procedure standards
in ways that facilitated arrests and evidence gathering.186 Of particular
importance for the present discussion, they drastically enlarged the warrantless
felony-arrest authority of peace officers, but not of private persons. This
enlargement occurred in two steps: First, the judges differentiated the powers of
a peace officer from that of a private person by allowing the officer to arrest on
a “charge” of felony made by someone else, even if no felony had actually been
committed. Second, they jettisoned the felony-in-fact requirement completely
by allowing a peace officer (but not a private person) to make a warrantless
arrest so long as he had probable cause that a felony might have been
committed.187

traces of the original understanding of “due process of law,” see, for example, In re Powers, 25 Vt. 261,
261 n.1 (1853) (“Except in cases of reasonable belief of treason, or felony, or breach of the peace,
committed in the presence of an officer, there is no due process of law without warrant issued by a
court or magistrate . . . .”); infra note 260.
184. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 173–74 (noting that Blackstone’s Commentaries
were intended to serve as an introduction to the study of law).
185. In the aftermath of independence, some states passed statutes prohibiting citations of English
cases decided after July 4, 1776. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 186 n.586 (speculating
that Wakely did not discuss Samuel for this reason). However, that prohibition was short-lived.
186. One of the judges’ innovations had offsetting implications. Specifically, English judges
announced a more restrictive standard for admitting confessions obtained by complainant–prosecutors
by ruling that “a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,
comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it is rejected.”
King v. Warrickshall, 1 Leach 263, 263–64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (Old Bailey 1783). But the judges
ruled in the same case that, although induced confessions were inadmissible, the complainant–
prosecutors were permitted to exploit the information obtained during such inadmissible confessions to
discover the location of stolen property, and the property itself was admissible as evidence. See id. The
latter aspect of the ruling likely was of at least as much practical importance for obtaining convictions
as the former. See Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1021–24 (comparing the two
aspects of the Warrickshall ruling).
187. See Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566
(1936); see also Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 628 n.214.
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1. The English “On Charge” Justification for a Warrantless Felony Arrest
The first change was made in the 1780 ruling of the King’s Bench in Samuel
v. Payne.188 Hall, a private person, had accused Samuel of stealing laces (a
felony) and Constable Payne had assisted Hall in making a warrantless arrest of
Samuel. However, the prosecution was dismissed for lack of proof that a felony
had actually been committed (apparently the laces were never recovered).
Samuel then sued both Hall and Constable Payne for trespass damages. Lord
Mansfield, chief justice of the King’s Bench, presided at the trespass trial and
instructed the jury that Constable Payne did not enjoy any special protection
from trespass liability.189 The jury then found both Hall and Constable Payne
liable for trespass.190 Constable Payne then moved for a new trial before the full
bench of the King’s Bench, and the judges (including Mansfield) then ruled that
the prior rule was “inconvenient” (inappropriate) and that only the person who
made the false charge of felony, but not the peace officer who assisted, should
be liable for the trespass resulting from the unlawful warrantless felony arrest.191
On retrial, Hall, the accuser, was again found liable, but Constable Payne was
not.192 Thereafter, officers enjoyed a degree of warrantless-arrest authority—the
“on charge” justification—a private person did not.
The Samuel ruling was soon discussed in some American sources, but
American courts did not immediately follow it. For example, it was not
mentioned when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the justification
for a warrantless felony arrest in 1814193 (possibly because of a state statute that
prohibited citation of English cases decided after 1776).194 Indeed, as late as 1824
Nathan Dane discussed Samuel in his Digest of American Law with the
cautionary introduction, “[i]f this case be law.”195 A New York court nonetheless

188. 1 Doug. 359, 360, 99 Eng. Rep. 230, 231 (K.B. 1780) (report first published 1782); see also
Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 184–85 (discussing the case).
189. See also CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 40, at 109, 116–17 (extracting an essay by
Saunders Welch, a high constable of London, advising constables that if they arrest on the report of a
felony by another person, based on the other person’s knowledge, they should require the other person
to attend the arrest, and further advising that “in all cases of [arrest on] suspicion, not from your own
knowledge, the safest way is to refer the parties to a justice of the peace, and act on his warrant”).
190. Samuel, 1 Doug. at 359–60, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230–31.
191. Id. Five years later, Mansfield summed up the post-Samuel rule of warrantless felony arrest by
saying “[w]hen a felony has been committed, any person may arrest on reasonable suspicion. When no
felony has been committed, an officer may arrest on a charge.” Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug. 339, 343, 99
Eng. Rep. 911, 913 (K.B. 1785). However, this report of Cooper was not published until 1831. Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 561 n.19.
192. Samuel, 1 Doug. at 360 n.8, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231 n.8.
193. See, e.g., the 1814 Pennsylvania Wakely decision, discussed supra notes 179–82 and
accompanying text.
194. See supra note 185.
195. 3 DANE, supra note 40, at 72 (volume published 1824). Dane actually overstated Samuel when
he wrote, “If this case be law, it settles the long agitated point, and proves a peace officer may arrest on
a reasonable suspicion of felony without a warrant, though no felony has been committed.” Id. Samuel
actually did not go that far; rather it relieved the officer of trespass liability only if the officer arrested
on a charge of felony made by another person.
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imported Samuel’s “on charge” justification in 1829,196 and thereafter American
jurisdictions generally accepted the on-charge justification for a warrantless
felony arrest by a peace officer.197
2. The Bare-Probable-Cause Justification for Warrantless Felony Arrests
English judges made the second and more-fundamental innovation when
they eliminated the felony-in-fact requirement for a lawful warrantless arrest by
a peace officer in the 1827 ruling Beckwith v. Philby.198 Philby, a constable,
suspected from circumstances and comments (but not “charges”) made by
others that Beckwith had stolen a horse; so he arrested Beckwith. It turned out,
however, that the horse was not stolen, so no felony had actually been
committed. Beckwith then sued Philby for trespass damages for false arrest
because the arrest was plainly unlawful under common-law doctrine. But Chief
Justice Tenterden ruled that an officer could make a lawful felony arrest if there
were reasonable grounds to suspect a felony had been committed, even if none
had.199 Notably, Tenderden’s Beckwith opinion did not admit its innovation (as
Samuel had) but instead pretended to simply be applying existing law.200 Later
English commentators then embellished that judicial falsehood.201
In a real sense, Beckwith’s adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for
warrantless felony arrests marks the birth of modern investigatory criminal
procedure. The new rule allowed an officer to draw inferences regarding a
possible felony from hearsay accounts provided by persons who were unable or
unwilling to act as a named complainant. Indeed, a complainant alleging
personal knowledge of a felony was no longer needed. Instead, the peace officer
could arrest on his own judgment and initiative, and enjoyed considerable
latitude for making erroneous arrests. This new investigatory power
undoubtedly facilitated the development of modern policing when the first
English police department, the London “Bobbies,” was formed two years after
Beckwith was decided.202

196. The earliest American reported decision to adopt the Samuel rule seems to have been Holley v.
Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 353 (N.Y. 1829).
197. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 636.
198. 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1827).
199. Id. at 638–39, 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. A similar ruling was announced two years later in Davis v.
Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 362–68, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102–04 (C.C. 1829).
200. Beckwith cited Samuel’s “on charge” rule as though it were the same as probable cause of a
crime, which it was not. Beckwith, 6 B. & C. at 636, 638–96, 108 Eng. Rep. at 585, 586.
201. See, e.g., 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193
(1883) (attributing the probable-cause standard to Hale’s treatise, but not giving any specific page cite
for that claim); see also Hall, supra note 187, at 567 (criticizing Stephen’s claim).
202. See, e.g., 4 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 158–207 (1968) (discussing the creation of the London police
department in 1829).
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3. The American Importation of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard for
Warrantless Felony Arrests
American state judges, who also appear to have become concerned with
increasing disorder and property crime, began to import the new English bareprobable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests around the middle of the
nineteenth century. The earliest American reported case to endorse bare
probable cause appears to have been the 1844 Pennsylvania decision Russell v.
Shuster.203 Massachusetts followed in 1850,204 and most other American
jurisdictions had done likewise by the end of the nineteenth century.205 Thus,
Chief Justice Taft could correctly describe the bare-probable-cause standard as
the “usual rule” for warrantless felony arrests in his 1925 majority opinion in
Carroll v. United States.206 Like the English judges who decided Beckwith, the
American judges who imported the bare-probable-cause standard pretended to
be merely applying prior common law while actually ignoring the earlier felonyin-fact requirement.207 Notably, none of those judges mentioned either the
Fourth Amendment or any of the state provisions that tracked the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause standard for warrants. Rather, bare probable
cause was simply imported as part of what the judges described as the “common
law” of arrest.
The importation of the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony
arrests provoked some resistance. A North Carolina judge opined in 1856 that
the new standard “go[es] very far in the justification of officers, who apprehend
suspected persons without warrants . . . farther than is compatible with that

203. 8 Watts & Serg. 308, 309 (Pa. 1844) (reporting that Chief Justice Gibson recited that “[a]
constable may justify an arrest for reasonable cause of suspicion alone; and in this respect he stands on
more favorable ground than a private person, who must show, in addition to such cause, that a felony
was actually committed”). For a brief discussion of the case, see Davies, Correcting History, supra note
3, at 188 n.593.
204. Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284 (1850) (reciting that “[p]eace-officers without
warrant may arrest suspected felons,” and citing Samuel and Beckwith while falsely claiming that the
1814 Pennsylvania ruling in Wakely “is to the same effect”). Wakely is discussed supra notes 179–82 and
accompanying text.
205. Later in the nineteenth century state legislatures often included the bare-probable-cause
standard for warrantless felony arrests in state arrest statutes. See, e.g., Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529, 535–36 (1900) (describing a state statute that included the “on charge” and “probable cause”
justifications for felony arrest as a codification of “common law”). However, some states have never
bothered to formally enact the bare-probable-cause standard. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-103
(2010) (stating grounds for arrest by officer without warrant but including the felony-in-fact
requirement and omitting the bare-probable-cause-standard itself).
206. 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (“The usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant one
believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony . . . .”).
207. For example, in 1844 the Pennsylvania court did not mention that it was effectively overruling
its own earlier 1814 decision in Wakely (discussed supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text) when it
adopted the Beckwith probable cause justification. Russell, 8 Watts. & Serg. at 309 (citing no prior
authorities regarding the felony arrest standard although counsel had cited Wakely). Likewise, when
the Massachusetts court adopted the novel Beckwith probable-cause justification in 1850, it incorrectly
cited the 1780 English ruling in Samuel and the 1814 Pennsylvania ruling in Wakely as being “to the
same effect”—which neither was. Rohan, 59 Mass. at 284.
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personal liberty, of which English jurists are so fond of boasting.”208 New York
reinstituted the felony-in-fact requirement by statute, and still required proof of
a felony in fact to justify a warrantless felony arrest as late as 1939.209 Similarly,
Congress initially included a felony-in-fact requirement when it finally got
around to enacting statutory warrantless arrest authority for FBI officers in
1935, but then dropped that requirement in 1948.210
C. Defining “Probable Cause”
Of course, the definition of “probable cause” took on additional significance
when it became the stand-alone standard for criminal arrests. The federal courts
had had several occasions to define probable cause during the decades that
immediately followed the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The earliest Supreme
Court discussion of probable cause seems to have occurred in the 1807 ruling in
Ex parte Bollman.211 In that habeas corpus proceeding, the Marshall Court ruled
that an arrest warrant for treason lacked the probable cause required by the
Fourth Amendment because no evidence had been offered to show
“unequivocally” that the arrestees had actually engaged in levying war against
the United States.212 Thus, Bollman seems to have construed probable cause for
a criminal arrest warrant to require factual accusations that amounted to a
prima facie showing of guilt.
A few years later in 1811, Justice Bushrod Washington had occasion to
define the probable cause required to support an arrest by warrant while
presiding in a malicious prosecution case, Munns v. De Nemours.213 The
defendants had obtained an arrest warrant and indictment of Munns for theft of
a brass pounder used in producing gunpowder. Although it appeared that the
pounder had been stolen by another man who had recently been in Munns’
company, the jury in a Delaware state criminal trial acquitted Munns of the
theft. Munns then sued for malicious prosecution, and the defendants removed
the case to the federal circuit court under diversity jurisdiction. While presiding
at the civil trial, Washington charged the jury that probable cause was a defense
to liability even if the defendants had acted with malice.

208. Brockway v. Crawford, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 433, 439–40 (1856) (Battle, J., dissenting) (specifically
criticizing the English rulings in Samuel and Beckwith).
209. See Morgan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (interpreting
state statute to permit police to arrest without warrant only when a felony has in fact been committed).
210. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 210–12.
211. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126–37 (1807). In an earlier proceeding in the same matter in the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia, Chief Judge Cranch had also opined that the issuance of the arrest
warrant in the case was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Bollman, 24 F.
Cas. 1189, 1190, 1192–93 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622) (still identifying the Fourth Amendment as the
“sixth article of the amendments”).
212. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 110. Note that the Treason Clause in Article III explicitly makes
taking up arms an element of treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
213. 17 Fed. Cas. 993 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9926).

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD

49

Washington further charged that “probable cause” meant “a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant [justify] a cautious man in the belief, that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”214 Washington’s
formulation of probable cause appears to have drawn upon Hawkins’ earlier
“candid and impartial man” formulation,215 but Washington’s definition added
“belief, that the person accused is guilty” to Hawkins’s strong “suspicion” as
though the two concepts were equivalent—notwithstanding that “belief” set a
higher threshold than “suspicion.”216 Washington then advised the jury that in
the circumstances of this case (in which an arrest warrant had issued and a
grand jury had indicted), the defendants did have probable cause, and the jury
found for the defendants.217
However, the federal courts treated probable cause differently in
noncriminal customs proceedings. In particular, the Marshall Court in 1813
gave a shorter and more relaxed definition of “probable cause” in the context of
customs enforcement in Locke v. United States.218 Under the federal customs
statutes, if a prosecuting customs officer showed probable cause that a customs
violation had been committed—even though he could not specify when or how
it had been done—the burden of proof shifted to the claimant, who opposed the
condemnation of a ship or goods, to prove that customs requirements had been
complied with.219 In the course of upholding the shifting of the burden of proof
on the condemnation at issue, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “in all cases of
[customs] seizure [probable cause] has a fixed and well known meaning. It
imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”220 Yet
Marshall did not suggest that this definition applied to criminal warrants, and
notably, in another customs case during the same term, Attorney General
214. Id. at 995. The verb “to warrant . . . a belief” is a synonym for “to justify a belief” or “to
authorize a belief”; it was not a reference to a judicial arrest or search warrant.
215. See supra text accompanying note 73. Of course, Washington did not include any citations to
authority in the jury charge in Munns. The likelihood that Washington consulted Hawkins’ treatise is
nonetheless supported by Washington’s doubt about whether it was necessary, for the justification of
the execution of an arrest warrant, that a theft had actually been committed. Compare Munns, 17 Fed
Cas. at 996, with Hawkins’ view, discussed supra text accompanying note 72.
216. In his 1828 dictionary, Noah Webster, who was a contemporary of the American framing era,
defined “believe” as “to be persuaded of the truth of something upon the declaration of another, or
upon evidence” and as “[t]o have a firm persuasion of anything.” 1 WEBSTER, supra note 156 (pages
unnumbered). In contrast, he defined “suspect” as “to imagine or have a slight opinion that something
exists, but without proof and often upon weak evidence or no evidence at all,” and gave essentially the
same definition for “suspicion.” 2 id. He also defined “probable” as meaning “[l]ikely; having more
evidence than the contrary, or evidence which inclines the mind to belief, but leaves some room for
doubt.” 2 id. Given these definitions, the older phrasing of “probable cause to suspect” was something
of an oxymoron; “probable cause to believe” was more congruent.
217. Munns, 17 Fed Cas. at 997. Washington also stated that it was for the jury to determine the
truth of the circumstances on which probable cause was allegedly based, but that it was for the court to
determine whether those circumstances constituted probable cause. Id. at 995.
218. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
219. Id. at 348.
220. Id.
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Pinkney argued that customs procedure should be more relaxed than criminal
procedure.221 Likewise, Justice Washington’s joining in the seemingly weaker
statement of probable cause in the Locke ruling without comment also seems to
confirm that “probable cause” carried a looser meaning in the customs seizure
context than in the criminal arrest context he had addressed in Munns.
Justice Washington’s definition of probable cause in Munns was widely cited
in later false-imprisonment or malicious-prosecution cases that arose from
criminal proceedings.222 However, later cases sometimes offered slight variations
regarding the “suspicion” and “belief” thresholds for probable cause,223 and a
few state courts vacillated between defining probable cause as information that
supported a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee had committed a felony or as
a reasonable belief that the arrestee had committed a felony.224 It may be
significant, though, that, even under the criterion of a strong suspicion or belief
in guilt, appellate courts reviewing malicious prosecution jury verdicts tended to
rule that the facts in the cases satisfied that standard.225
Justice Hunt’s 1878 opinion for the Supreme Court in Stacey v. Emery226 also
endorsed Washington’s Munns definition of probable cause in the course of
discussing grounds for a certificate of probable cause in customs proceedings.
Hunt stated that the threshold for probable cause was met “[i]f the facts and
circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and

221. See The Schooner Jane v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 363, 363 (1813) (recording
comments from Attorney General Pinkney that “[i]f these [condemnation] cases are to be likened to
criminal prosecutions, and if the same strictness be required, it will be impossible to execute the laws
[regulating imports].”).
222. See, e.g., Cabiness v. Martin, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 454, 455–56 (1832); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Den.
617, 619 (1846).
223. A slight variation appeared in Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217, 238–39 (1849)
(“Probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person accused is
guilty.”). See also Eastman v. Keasor, 44 N.H. 518, 520 (1863) (following Bacon and attributing the
definition in that case to Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).
There were other formulations. See Burt v. Smith, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (N.Y. 1905) (“Probable cause is the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he
has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of.”); Runo v. Williams,
122 P. 1082, 1085 (Cal. 1912) (“Probable cause is, in effect, the concurrence of the belief of guilt with
the existence of facts and circumstances reasonably warranting the belief.”).
224. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 380 n.480 (discussing the different standards).
225. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Leland, 1 Me. 135, 138 (1820) (overturning jury verdict for plaintiff in
malicious prosecution action while noting the “liberality of construction on the question of probable
cause, in favor of the prosecutor . . .”); Swaim v. Stafford, 25 N.C. 289, 293 (1843) (overturning jury
verdict for plaintiff in malicious prosecution action while concluding that “[a]ll these facts and
circumstances, as it seems to us, were sufficiently strong to induce the defendant to believe that the
plaintiff was guilty, and in law amounted to a probable cause . . .”); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Denio 617,
620–21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) (permitting new trial in malicious prosecution action after verdict for
plaintiff while stating that “the verdict was clearly wrong”); Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. 217, 238–42
(1849) (setting aside verdict for plaintiff in malicious prosecution action because trial judge did not
properly instruct the jury as to the facts that might prove probable cause).
226. 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
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caution in believing that the offense has been committed.”227 Thus, Stacey
effectively applied the criminal definition of probable cause to customs
proceedings, as well, and ended the distinction that seemed to have been
recognized in Locke. The Stacey definition then became the formulation that
federal courts generally used on later occasions,228 including the Supreme
Court’s 1925 ruling in Carroll v. United States229 and the 1949 ruling in Brinegar
v. United States.230
D. How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard for
Warrantless Felony Arrests Transformed Criminal Procedure
No matter how bare probable cause was defined, the adoption of that
standard facilitated a drastic expansion of government arrest and search
authority. Indeed, it is hardly a coincidence that the adoption of this relaxed
standard more or less coincided with the appearance of urban police
departments.231
Common-law accusatory procedure had been dependent on a private
complainant’s willingness to denounce a crime that had actually been
committed. As a result, government officers had been allowed little room to
initiate criminal prosecutions themselves. Indeed, the requirement of a named
complainant alleging personal knowledge of the crime, coupled with the risks
that attended that role, had constituted the principal protection that the
common law offered against arbitrary warrantless arrest. However, adoption of
the bare-probable-cause warrantless felony-arrest standard destroyed that
protection by allowing government officers to initiate criminal prosecutions by
“ferreting out criminal activity” on their own assessment of the circumstances.232
As a result, the bare-probable-cause standard substantially enlarged the room
for police officers to justify mistaken arrests of innocent persons. Moreover,
although the bare-probable-cause standard directly justified only warrantless
arrests for felony offenses, it carried far broader practical implications for
227. Id. at 645.
th
228. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 ( 8 Cir. 1923) (“Probable cause which will
justify an arrest is reasonable grounds of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in his belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense of
which he is suspected.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 658 (N.D. W. Va. 1922)
(same).
229. 267 U.S. 132, 161, 162 (1925) (quoting the definition of probable cause in Stacey and then
slightly revising that in the context of the specific issue in the case by stating that the officers’ search
was justified because “the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that [illegal liquor was in the car]”).
230. 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
231. See, e.g., JAMES P. HALL, PEACEKEEPING IN AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 86 (1975) (noting that the transition from urban nightwatches to
police departments occurred in New York City in 1844, in Chicago in 1851, in New Orleans and
Cincinnati in 1852, in Boston and Philadelphia in 1854).
232. The famous “ferreting” phrase is Justice Jackson’s. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1949).
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criminal procedure. One implication was that the relaxed standard for
warrantless felony arrests increased the opportunities for police to make
warrantless searches—and thus discover evidence of additional crimes.
The adoption of bare probable cause as the standard for warrantless felony
arrests also seems to have spilled over and affected arrest warrant standards in
several ways. For one thing, the common-law requirement of an allegation of
crime-in-fact for issuance of an arrest or search warrant seems to have
disappeared soon after the adoption of bare probable cause as a warrantless
arrest standard.233 Likewise, allowing the use of hearsay information that would
have been inadmissible at trial to support a finding of probable cause for a
warrantless felony arrest seems to have led to allowing hearsay to support the
issuance of an arrest warrant as well.234 The rationale for these relaxations of
warrant standards likely was that it made no sense to require an officer to
present more or better information to obtain a felony arrest warrant than he
would need to justify a warrantless felony arrest.235 That change, in turn,
eventually led to allowing “confidential informants”—who play a prominent
role in modern police investigations—whose identity is never disclosed to the
defendant, or even to the issuing magistrate or reviewing court.236 Likewise, the
oath requirement came to mean little more than that a police affiant swore to
having received unsworn hearsay information from someone else.
Of course, the expansion of the warrantless arrest authority of the officer
also ultimately led to an overall decline of warrant usage. That in turn meant
that magistrates ceased to actively supervise police decisions as to whether to
make searches or arrests and instead merely assessed such actions after they
occurred. The shift to police-initiated arrests also appears to have opened the

233. The requirement of an accusation of a felony in fact for issuance of an arrest warrant may have
disappeared virtually contemporaneously with the adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for
warrantless felony arrests. For example, an 1853 treatise published in New York stated that a
magistrate could issue an arrest warrant “[i]f in reference to the creditability of the complainant, and to
all matters stated by him, there are, according to the understanding of the magistrate, reasonable
grounds for supposing the accused to be guilty” and that, with regard to “the amount of evidence”
required “in order to authorize the magistrate to grant his warrant, no very definite rule has been or
can be laid down,” but “[i]t is sufficient if the testimony shows a probable case of guilt.” 1 A COMPLETE
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30 n.1 (Thomas W. Waterman ed., Albany N.Y.,
Gould, Banks & Co. 1853).
234. In 1932 the Supreme Court still stated that “[a] search warrant may issue only upon evidence
which would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury”—a standard that would seem to
preclude use of hearsay. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932). However, the Court
subsequently described Grau’s statement as an anomaly in Brinegar v United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
n.13 (1949).
235. Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269–70 (1960) (noting that it would be “incongruous”
to apply a higher standard for probable cause to support an arrest warrant than that which would
suffice for a warrantless arrest).
236. Early cases that permitted probable cause for an arrest to be based on informant hearsay
tended to require that the informant be identified, notwithstanding the general “informant’s privilege”
recognized in the law of evidence. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW 769 n.9 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (citing cases).
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way for police interrogation of suspects.237 Hence, it is not too much to say that
the adoption of the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests
transformed criminal procedure.238
V
THE INVENTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AND THE
ADOPTION OF BARE PROBABLE CAUSE AS A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
STANDARD
The Supreme Court formulated modern Fourth Amendment doctrine
during the early decades of the twentieth century. The seminal ruling was the
1914 decision in Weeks v. United States.239 In that case, the Supreme Court
innovated in several ways: (1) it ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to
the conduct of a federal officer as well as to the courts and Congress;240 (2) in
ruling that a warrantless search of a house by a federal marshal violated the
Fourth Amendment, it read the common-law requirement of a warrant for a
house search into the Fourth Amendment itself;241 and (3) it created the searchand-seizure exclusionary rule when it held (in an echo of Marbury v. Madison)242
that a federal court did not possess authority to admit evidence that
government officers had obtained in violation of the Constitution.243 Although
Weeks and the cases that immediately followed it actually applied the Fourth
Amendment only to searches of houses or offices, usually for papers,244 the onset
of Prohibition in 1920 soon presented new search issues.

237. See Davies, Original Fifth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1030–32 (discussing the effects of the
shift to investigatory criminal procedure).
238. For a discussion of the emergence of modern policing during the nineteenth century, see
Wesley M. Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447
(2010).
239. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
240. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 729–30.
241. Id. at 730.
242. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (holding that federal courts lack constitutional authority to
apply an unconstitutional statute because “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . . courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument”).
243. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 730, n.521. The exclusionary rule did not appear
“late,” as its critics sometimes claim; rather, the rule was created roughly contemporaneously with the
appearance of the modern conception that unlawful conduct by officers constitutes a form of
government action. Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio That Misses the Larger
Exclusionary Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 622–25 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Mapp]; see also
supra note 96. Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search
and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821, 1852–62 (2002).
244. E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (unlawful seizure of
business records from office); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (warrantless seizure of
paper from office); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (warrantless entry of house).
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A. The Invention of Warrantless Searches (Beyond Those Incident to Arrest)
in Carroll v. United States
Enforcement of Prohibition necessarily required searches for illegal liquor,
including searches of automobiles transporting illegal liquor. Because it was not
feasible for police to obtain warrants to search automobiles, the federal courts
were confronted with whether the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless
searches of automobiles. Although the Supreme Court had acknowledged the
continuing validity of the common-law search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in
dicta in Weeks,245 there was a doctrinal obstacle that prevented use of the searchincident-to-arrest doctrine. The difficulty was that Prohibition violations were
often misdemeanors.246 But under common-law or statutory standards it was still
the rule that bare probable cause could justify a warrantless arrest only for a
felony; a warrantless misdemeanor arrest was lawful only when the
misdemeanor was actually being committed “in the view of” or “presence of”
the arresting officer—a standard understood to mean that the officer had to
actually observe the offense being committed.247 Because the illegal liquor being
transported in a vehicle was rarely in plain view, neither a warrantless arrest nor
a search incident to such an arrest could usually be justified.
However, because investigatory searches were plainly necessary if police
were to enforce Prohibition offenses, the lower federal courts showed
considerable creativity in upholding warrantless automobile searches.248 Their
most notable response was to begin to construe the right against “unreasonable
searches and seizures” set out in the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as
though it created a free-standing “reasonableness” standard for assessing
government searches. These courts then announced, without citing precedent,
that the Fourth Amendment did not forbid all warrantless searches; rather, it
forbade only “unreasonable” warrantless searches, and a warrantless search was
reasonable and constitutional so long as the officers had bare probable cause

245. See 232 U.S. 383, 392 (indicating that the Court was not disapproving “an assertion of the right
on the part of the Government . . . to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime . . . [n]or is it the case of burglar’s tools or other proofs of guilt
found upon his arrest within the control of the accused”).
However, the new exclusionary rule exerted an indirect effect on arrest law. As a practical matter, the
legality of an arrest mattered primarily to assess the constitutionality of the search that accompanied it.
But because the constitutionality of searches was tested in motions to suppress evidence decided prior
to trial, the old ex post, actual-guilt justification (discussed supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text),
which depended on a conviction at trial, became irrelevant.
246. The National Prohibition Act defined first or second offenses as misdemeanors, third offenses
as felonies. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
247. See id. at 157 (noting that “the [misdemeanor] is not committed in [the officer’s] presence
unless he can by his senses detect that the liquor is being transported”).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Fenton, 268 F. 221, 222–23 (D. Mont. 1920) (ruling that the United
States was “vested with the right of property and possession” in illegal liquor, and thus was entitled to
seize it); United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (“[I]t is not unreasonable for a
prohibition enforcement officer to stop automobiles upon the public highway and search them for
intoxicating liquors without a warrant, and the finding of liquor justifies the search.”).
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that a violation was occurring.249 The Supreme Court adopted this novel
construction of the Fourth Amendment in 1925 in Carroll v. United States when
it held that bare probable cause sufficed for a constitutional warrantless search
of an automobile (even though it could not justify a warrantless arrest).250
Two features of Chief Justice Taft’s Carroll opinion are noteworthy here.
One is that it reiterated the traditional formulation—previously articulated in
Munns and Stacey—that probable cause was met if “the facts and circumstances
within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant [that is, to justify] a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is being
committed].”251 But there was arguably a gap between that verbiage and the
substance of the definition; as Justice McReynolds pithily pointed out in dissent,
the facts in Carroll were such that the majority had effectively ruled there was
probable cause to search a car merely “because a man once agreed to deliver
whisky, but did not . . . [and] thereafter he venture[d] to drive an automobile on
the road to Detroit.”252
The other noteworthy feature of Taft’s opinion was the purportedly
originalist justification he offered to support Carroll’s claim that warrantless
searches of vehicles were “reasonable” and thus constitutional, so long as the
officer had probable cause. Specifically, Taft noted in the 1789 Collections Act
the First Congress had authorized customs officers to make warrantless
searches of ships if the officer had “reason to suspect” a customs violation.253
But this claim was merely an instance of judicial-chambers historical fiction.254
The Framers would have understood that ships were not included among the
“houses, papers, and effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment; indeed, that
formula likely was included precisely to exclude ships.255 Thus, the Framers
would not have thought that the Fourth Amendment had any bearing on
customs searches of ships—or vice versa. Indeed, although the Supreme Court
had decided numerous ship-seizure cases between 1789 and 1925, none had ever
so much as mentioned the Fourth Amendment.256

249. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 658 (N.D.W. Va. 1922) (Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches, not warrantless searches); Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413, 416–
17 (9th Cir. 1922) (Fourth Amendment prohibits “all unreasonable searches” and what is unreasonable
must necessarily be determined according to the facts and circumstances); United States v. McBride,
287 F. 214, 216 (S.D. Ala. 1922) (Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable search, not
warrantless search); Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1923) (same).
250. 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925).
251. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. This definition was repeated with minor changes in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949), and is now usually cited to Brinegar rather than Carroll.
252. 267 U.S. at 174.
253. Id. at 150 (citing 1789 Collections Act, 1 Stat. 29, 43).
254. This historical claim seems to have been composed by Taft; it does not appear in the briefs filed
in Carroll.
255. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
256. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 607–08.
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Carroll’s endorsement of reading the first clause of the Fourth Amendment
as a free-standing Reasonableness Clause was also the likely catalyst for the
fabrication of the academic version of conventional Fourth Amendment
history. In a dissertation published as a monograph in 1937, political scientist
Nelson B. Lasson asserted that the last-minute change during the House debate
in which Madison’s “by warrants issuing” had been replaced with “and no
warrant shall issue”—the change that had created the final two-clause text—had
been made for the purpose of creating an overarching “reasonableness”
standard for all government searches.257 Although there was not a shred of
evidence for that fanciful claim,258 it dovetailed so nicely with the Supreme
Court’s own textual creativity that it became the cornerstone for the
conventional account of Fourth Amendment history.259
B. Probable Cause as the Federal Statutory and Constitutional Standard for
Warrantless Felony Arrests
Carroll explicitly applied the Fourth Amendment’s bare-probable-cause
standard to assessing the constitutionality of the search at issue, but still
discussed the arrest only in terms of “the usual rule” for a lawful arrest.260 This
narrow focus on searches was still evident in 1949 when the Court reiterated
Carroll’s formulation of probable cause in another automobile search case,
Brinegar v. United States.261 Although Justice Rutledge’s majority opinion in
Brinegar did state at one point that “[t]he crucial question is whether there was
probable cause for Brinegar’s arrest,” all of the analysis in the opinion was in
terms of whether “probable cause to search exist[ed].”262

257. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937). Lasson’s monograph was his dissertation: Nelson
B. Lisansky, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment (Ph.D. Dissertation, Political
Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1934). Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 27 n.45.
Lasson also invented a rather preposterous claim that the motion to substitute “and no warrant shall
issue” was voted down in the House, but then was surreptitiously added in by the later committee on
style. See LASSON, supra, at 102–03. Yet, although there are conflicting accounts of the House debate,
including even the identity of the person who made the motion, the weight of available evidence clearly
indicates that the motion for the substitution carried. Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 716–21.
258. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
259. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 569 n.38 (citing opinions and commentaries that
have uncritically repeated Lasson’s claims).
260. 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). Indeed, Justice McReyold’s dissent asserted that the warrantless
misdemeanor arrest in that case “was unauthorized, illegal, and violated the guarantee of due process
given by the Fifth Amendment”—but did not apply the Fourth Amendment to the arrest. Id. at 170
(emphasis added).
261. 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949).
262. See also Justice Minton’s 1950 discussion that “[o]f course, a search without warrant incident to
an arrest is dependent initially on a valid arrest” but that “[w]here one had been placed in the custody
of the law by valid action of officers, it was not unreasonable to search him” and “[i]t is [only]
unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950).
THE
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One explanation for the Court’s slowness in applying the Fourth
Amendment’s bare-probable-cause standard to warrantless arrests was that
Congress did not get around to adopting statutory warrantless-felony-arrest
authority for federal officers until the 1930s, which meant that the warrantlessarrest authority of federal officers depended on state law. Moreover, when
Congress finally did act, it initially reverted to the framing-era requirement that
a felony had to have been actually committed in fact, and it further limited the
warrantless arrest authority of FBI agents to instances in which there were
reasonable grounds to fear that the person to be arrested would escape if the
agent undertook to obtain an arrest warrant.263 Congress deleted the felony-infact requirement in 1948 and deleted the reason-to-fear-escape criterion in
1950.264 Thereafter, in the 1959 ruling Draper v. United States, the Supreme
Court announced that the statutory probable-cause standard was equivalent to
the constitutional standard for warrantless felony arrests.265
VI
PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE WARREN COURT
The Warren Court’s “due process revolution” during the 1960s consisted
largely of “incorporating” federal constitutional criminal-procedure standards
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, making the federal
standards applicable to state criminal proceedings.266 In particular, the Court
announced the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment in 1960 in Elkins v.
United States267 and applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states in 1961 in
Mapp v. Ohio.268
Additionally, the Warren Court shored up the “warrant requirement”269 and
made significant rulings regarding the use of informant hearsay to establish
probable cause; but these latter rulings carried contrasting implications. On the
one hand, the Court sought to ensure that police would provide a magistrate
with adequate information to independently assess whether there was probable
cause to support a warrant when the police were relying on a confidential

263. Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at 208–11.
264. Id. at 211–12.
265. 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (equating “probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment with
“reasonable grounds” in the arrest provision of the Narcotic Control Act); see also Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (equating the “reasonable grounds” statutory standard for warrantless
arrests by FBI agents with the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard); Davies, Correcting
History, supra note 3, at 212–13.
266. See, e.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 415–16 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002)
(chronicling the process of incorporation).
267. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Despite the widespread view that the substance of the Fourth Amendment
had been incorporated earlier in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), Justice Stewart’s opinion in
Elkins distorted what had actually been said in Wolf. See Davies, Mapp, supra note 243, at 626 n.24.
268. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
269. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (ruling that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”).
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informant’s tip. Under the two-prong Aguilar–Spinelli standard, the Court held
that a police affidavit seeking a warrant on the basis of a confidential
informant’s tip must set out, in addition to the factual grounds for probable
cause, both how the informant had obtained the relevant information and why
the informant could be believed.270 The justices apparently hoped that this twoprong standard would provide federal courts with a more-precise test for
reviewing the constitutionality of warrants issued by state judges.
On the other hand, the Warren Court also sapped the probable-cause
standard of much of its substance when it ruled that police need not disclose the
identity of a “confidential informant,” even to the magistrate from whom a
warrant was sought, or during a motion to suppress proceeding.271 As a practical
matter, that ruling seems to have created an opportunity for police to meet the
so-called “credibility” prong of the Aguilar–Spinelli standard simply by
perjuriously reciting that a confidential informant had previously provided
accurate information—or perhaps even by inventing completely fictional
informant tips.272
In addition, the Warren Court created an entirely new branch of search-andseizure doctrine in 1968 when it ruled in Terry v. Ohio273 that police had the
authority to temporarily “stop” and “detain” persons whenever the officers had
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity, and could also “frisk” detained
persons for weapons if they had reasonable suspicion that the person might be
armed. This new standard was defined to be less demanding than probable
cause,274 but to require more than a mere hunch on the part of the police. The
Justices seem to have hoped that the new reasonable suspicion standard would
extend constitutional regulation to police conduct that was already common
practice. But because the probable-cause standard turned out to be not very
demanding in practice, and because Terry stops could produce grounds for
arrest,275 the net result of the Justices’ invention of the reasonable-suspicion
justification for less-intrusive detentions and frisks appears to have been a

270. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (requiring that a search-warrant affidavit based on
information from a confidential informant state both the way in which the informant acquired the
information and reasons to support the informant’s credibility); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
415–18 (1969) (ruling that corroboration of aspects of the informant’s information could not entirely
replace the required information).
271. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1964) (motion to suppress); McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311–12 (1967) (probable-cause hearing).
272. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 102–07 (1992) (noting pervasive police
perjury in search matters).
273. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
274. Notes from the justices’ conference suggest that the justices initially intended to simply rule
that the police officer in Terry had had probable cause to arrest, but then thought better of it. See
generally John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Fisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749 (1998).
275. In Terry itself, the frisk for weapons produced a gun, which provided probable cause to arrest
and that, in turn, provided authority to conduct a full search incident to arrest.

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD

59

substantial further expansion of police power.276 Nevertheless, the remnants of
the Warren Court majority still declared in 1972 that “[w]e allow our police to
make arrests only on ‘probable cause’ . . . . Arresting a person on suspicion, like
arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system, even when the
arrest is for past criminality.”277
VII
THE EVISCERATION AND EXPLOITATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE
BURGER, REHNQUIST, AND ROBERTS COURTS
The Warren Court’s extension of the protections of the Fourth Amendment
to state criminal proceedings fundamentally changed the politics of federal
criminal justice. Prior to the 1960s, federal constitutional standards had applied
largely to the sorts of white-collar or revenue prosecutions that did not scare or
incite the general public. But applying Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure
standards to the states—plus the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
compelled self-incrimination in Miranda v. Arizona278—meant that street
criminals could also claim constitutional protections. And that did scare and
incite the public. Richard Nixon exploited that fear in the 1968 presidential
election, and a tipping point occurred in criminal procedure when he was able
to fill four vacancies on the Court between 1969 and 1972 with law-and-order
appointees.279 Since that change, the interactions of presidential elections and
vacancies on the Court has produced what seems to be a permanent right-ofcenter majority, and the overall result has been a drastic dilution of Fourth
Amendment protections, including the evisceration of the bare-probable-cause
standard itself.
Although the Burger Court majority initially focused on restricting the
operation of the exclusionary rule,280 several early Burger Court opinions are
relevant insofar as they characterized bare probable cause as the “touchstone”
of “Fourth Amendment reasonableness”281 and also embellished the already
existing myth that bare probable cause had always been the common-law, or

276. For example, Terry has also provided the doctrinal basis for “protective sweeps” of houses,
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–35 (1990), and for “frisks” of automobiles for weapons, Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043–46 (1983).
277. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
278. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
279. See generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE (2001) (reporting that Nixon made
opposition to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings a primary criterion for choosing nominees
to the Supreme Court).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v, Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
281. The “touchstone” language initially appeared in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)
(“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
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even the “ancient,” standard for lawful warrantless arrests.282 In 1975 Justice
Powell blurred historical and modern citations together to erroneously imply
that the bare-probable-cause standard for warrantless felony arrests comported
with “the common-law antecedents” of the Fourth Amendment.283 A year later,
Justice White also asserted that the “ancient common law rule” permitted an
officer to make a warrantless arrest “if there was reasonable ground for making
the arrest.”284 He concluded that “[t]he balance struck by the common law in
generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without warrant, has
survived substantially intact.”285 But the Burger Court did not merely distort the
history of bare probable cause; rather, the conservative majority drastically
relaxed that standard in the 1983 ruling in Illinois v. Gates.286
A. Illinois v. Gates
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Gates altered the probable-cause
standard in several important ways. One was that it totally jettisoned the twoprong Aquilar–Spinelli requirement as to the kinds of information regarding
informant tips that had to be presented to a magistrate, and instead held that a
finding of probable cause was to be assessed on the basis of the “totality of the
circumstances.”287 That formulation meant that “everything is relevant, [but]
nothing is determinative.”288

282. The myth was well established by the time of the Burger Court. For example, Professor Horace
L. Wilgus imparted a false appearance of historical continuity in a 1924 article by comingling sources
from Coke and Hale with twentieth-century decisions and presenting them as though they evidenced a
consistent treatment of “common law” warrantless arrest authority. See generally Horace L. Wilgus,
Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924). Later commentators continued to reiterate the
myth. For example, Professor Landynski asserted in 1966 that at common law “[a] felon could be
apprehended on probable cause alone”—apparently without understanding that in framing-era usage
the term “felon” denoted the requirement that a felony had actually been committed. JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 45 (1966). For “ancient,” see Watson
v. United States, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (discussing the “ancient common law rule”).
283. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
284. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 (citing Hale, Blackstone, Samuel, Beckwith, and Rohan).
285. See id. at 421. Justice White made similar claims in his 1980 dissenting opinion in Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 607, 609 (1980) (White J. dissenting) (citing the English ruling in Beckwith and the
1850 Massachusetts decision in Rohan as though they reflected the “common law” standard for
warrantless arrests).
More recently, Justice Scalia has made similar claims. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rohan as though it were authority that common law authorized
that “a person may be arrested . . . on the basis of probable cause, without an arrest warrant”). And
additional commentators have done likewise. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Fourth Amendment,
Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 61, 71 (1996) (erroneously describing
the post-independence English rulings in Samuel and Beckwith, which expanded the warrantless arrest
authority of peace officers, as though they reflected framing-era common law and the American
Framers’ expectations).
286. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
287. 462 U.S. at 230.
288. Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570
(1984).
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Even more importantly, Gates drastically lowered the threshold for finding
probable cause by jettisoning the traditional criterion of information sufficient
to justify a prudent person’s strong suspicion or belief in guilt. To accommodate
the poorly corroborated and even partly erroneous anonymous tip in that case,
Justice Rehnquist announced that probable cause was satisfied if police had
information merely indicating a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of
criminal activity.289
The police investigation in Gates began with an anonymous letter asserting
that Sue and Lance Gates were drug dealers who had “over $ 100,000.00 worth
of drugs in their basement” and who brought drugs to their home by car from
Florida. The writer predicted that Sue would drive the car to Florida to be
loaded and then fly home, and that Lance would then fly down and drive the
loaded car home. But the letter oddly lacked some basic information; in
particular, the Gates’s address was simply given as “Greenway, in
Condominiums” without a house number. Moreover, it did not disclose the
means by which the tipster had obtained this information except by stating that
“[t]hey brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.”290 Nor did the letter indicate whether the tipster had heard
this personally or whether this was a hearsay report from someone else. Justice
Rehnquist conceded that the letter alone could not constitute probable cause.291
Subsequent police attempts to corroborate the tip revealed that the tipster
was correct on some points, but incorrect on others. The letter arrived too late
for the police to determine if Sue Gates had traveled as predicted.292 The police
did confirm, however, that “L. Gates” had a reservation to fly to West Palm
Beach, Florida, a few days later, and Lance Gates was then observed boarding
and deplaning from that flight. Significantly, he was then observed entering a
motel room registered in his wife’s name and was seen the next morning leaving
“with an unidentified woman” and driving onto a northbound highway in a car
with a license registered to the couple.293 Although Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
did not confront the point, Sue Gates’s presence in Florida—it was certainly
highly probable she was the so-called “unidentified woman”—was not only
contrary to the tipster’s travel prediction but also undercut the claim of a
quantity of drugs in the Gates’s basement. The odd travel predicted by the
tipster suggested that one of the couple always stayed at home to protect the
drugs, but that was not what the police actually observed.294 Moreover, the
police had merely observed the couple entering a northbound highway. But the

289. 462 U.S. at 238, 246 (“fair probability” of criminal activity); id. at 244 n.13 (“substantial
chance” of criminal activity).
290. Id. at 225.
291. Id. at 227.
292. See id. at 225–26 (stating that the police received the anonymous letter on May 3, 1978, the
same day Sue Gates was supposed to drive to Florida).
293. Id. at 226–27.
294. Id. at 291–92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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geography of Florida is such that one would do that to go to numerous vacation
sites such as Sea World as well as virtually anywhere else in North America.
Thus, the police actually had no significant information as to the Gates’s
destination when the search warrant was issued for their car and house.295
In sum, the information the police had at the time they obtained the search
warrant—which is the time that is relevant for assessing probable cause—
consisted of an anonymous tip that had been shown to be incorrect in important
ways and uncorroborated in others. Justice Rehnquist would have been hard
pressed to claim that that information was either “reasonably reliable” or that it
would have “suffice[d] to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief”
that the Gateses were transporting drugs.296 So he jettisoned that traditional
definition of probable cause and instead asserted that information that merely
indicated a “fair probability” of criminal activity would do. Moreover, Gates
also directed reviewing courts to generally defer to the judgment of the
magistrate who issued a warrant that probable cause had been shown.297
To provide precedential support for the “fair probability” formulation,
Justice Rehnquist exhumed Chief Justice Marshall’s 1813 description of
probable cause in Locke as “circumstances which warrant suspicion.”298 Justice
Rehnquist stated that this definition had been given “in a closely related
context” but did not actually disclose that Locke had articulated probable cause
in a customs forfeiture proceeding rather than as a standard for a criminal arrest
or search.299 Nor did he even mention the traditional definition of probable
cause as sufficient information to warrant a prudent person’s belief in guilt—the
definition of probable cause that Justices of the Court had recited for nearly a
century and a half in Munns, Stacey, Carroll, and Brinegar.300 Instead, Justice
Rehnquist followed the well-established judicial practice of making the history
seem to fit the desired result.
In a concurring opinion in Gates, Justice White warned that the Gates fairprobability formulation threatened to “eviscerate” the probable-cause standard

295. Id. at 292 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
297. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (“[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of [the showing of
probable cause in] an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s
‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’”).
298. Id. at 235 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (affirming
condemnation of imported goods as forfeit to the government)). In condemnation proceedings, the
burden of proof was on the person opposing condemnation provided only that that “probable cause is
shewn for such prosecution.” Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 341–42; see also id. at 348. It seems unlikely,
though, that Locke would have been regarded as a precedent for criminal procedure when it was
decided in 1813. See the discussion of Locke, supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
299. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235.
300. See supra notes 217, 226, 229, 230 and accompanying text. The closest Justice Rehnquist came
to acknowledging the earlier definition was to observe, in a footnote, that the Court had previously
discussed probable cause in terms of the officer’s “reasonable belief” that a suspect possessed drugs.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 n.7 (citing Ker v. California, 274 U.S. 23 (1963)).
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for all practical purposes.301 That fear was well-founded: although the
application of the traditional standard was never overly rigorous in practice,
lower-court judges have found probable cause to support police arrests and
searches on extremely marginal grounds under the fair-probability
formulation.302
Gates also laid the groundwork for the Burger Court to effectively end
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment’s explicit ban against the issuance of
warrants lacking probable cause. A year later, in 1984, the Burger Court
majority adopted the misnamed “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule
in United States v. Leon303 and announced that it no longer mattered if there
actually was probable cause for a warrant; rather, evidence seized pursuant to
an unconstitutionally issued warrant would be admissible for all purposes
provided that the police affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”304 That
is, anything more than a blank or purely conclusory affidavit will suffice to
admit evidence seized under a warrant.305 After Leon, the probable-cause
standard itself matters only for assessing the constitutionality of warrantless
police searches or arrests—and even then the police need to identify only
circumstances sufficient to indicate a fair probability of criminal activity.
B. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista and Virginia v. Moore
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have expanded police power in myriad
ways. But two additional decisions are especially relevant insofar as they exploit
the Gates fair-probability formulation of bare probable cause. The first is the
2001 decision of the Rehnquist Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in which
the majority upheld a custodial arrest, complete with handcuffs and booking, of
301. 462 U.S. at 272 (White, J., concurring) (declining to join the majority’s adoption of the “fair
probability” definition because it “threaten[ed] an evisceration of the probable-cause standard”). See
also Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV.
1061, 1065–70 (1987) (criticizing the Gates formulation of probable cause).
302. See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 381 n.482 (listing cases).
303. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The exception is misnamed because it has nothing to do with police “good
faith” in the ordinary meaning of that term. Rather, the Leon opinion consists of a syllogism based on
false dichotomies. The major premise is that the exclusionary rule was meant to apply only to police
rather than to magistrates (a false dichotomy); the minor premise is that issuance of an invalid warrant
is the fault of only the magistrate rather than the police officer (another false dichotomy because police
initiate the warrant request, and the analysis also totally omits the role of the prosecutor who
prescreened the warrant application); and the conclusion is that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
invalid warrants. Thus, the exception would more appropriately be labeled the blame-the-magistrate
exception. Police conduct is relevant under this analysis only if the departure from legal standards is so
egregious that no hypothetical officer could have thought that the warrant at issue could be valid.
304. Id. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)).
305. The justices previously ruled in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), that a bare
conclusory claim that a police officer knew of or had information regarding criminal activity, without
any statement of the factual grounds for that claim, was insufficient to justify issuance of a search
warrant. That minimal standard may now be the effective standard for “probable cause” as far as
warrants are concerned.
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a suburban “soccer mom” who had committed the heinous crime of not wearing
a seatbelt.306 Justice Souter’s majority opinion held that the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness standard did not limit police authority to make
arrests (and, by implication, searches of the arrestee’s person and vehicle
incident to such arrests) for even the most minor regulatory offenses.307 Justice
Souter’s opinion was noteworthy primarily for its unusually elaborate and
almost certainly deliberate distortions of framing-era arrest law.308 In particular,
he ran roughshod over the historical limitation of less-than-felony warrantless
arrests to “breaches of the peace” and indicated in dicta that the majority was
inclined to disregard any legal restriction on arrest authority other than the
Gates fair-probability standard itself—especially the genuinely historical
restriction of less-than-felony warrantless arrests to instances in which an officer
actually observed an ongoing offense.309
Atwater’s dicta became law in the 2009 decision of the Roberts Court in
Virginia v. Moore.310 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the unanimous Court in that
case tossed aside the settled prior rule—recognized in Carroll and numerous
other precedents—that only a lawful arrest can justify a constitutional search
incident to arrest.311 Instead, the justices announced that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard authorizes police to arrest whenever they
have bare probable cause—that is, a fair probability—that an offense of some
kind has been committed, regardless of whether the law of the jurisdiction
actually authorizes an arrest for that offense, or permits only the issuance of a
summons or ticket.312 That is so, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion, because
bare probable cause is the only constitutional criterion for assessing whether an
arrest comports with Fourth Amendment reasonableness, so any state criteria
for lawful arrests other than the probable-cause standard itself are “beyond the

306. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The majority indicated that Atwater could have been held for up to fortyeight hours before appearing before a magistrate without a violation of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. Id. at 352.
307. Id. at 354 (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.”).
308. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 274–365 (discussing Justice Souter’s mischaracterizations of
framing-era arrest law).
309. See id. at 382–88. Justice Souter’s Atwater opinion could address that point only in dicta
because the arresting officer actually had seen the commission of the lack-of-seatbelt offense.
310. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
311. See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court invented the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll precisely because no lawful warrantless
arrest could have been made for a misdemeanor violation regardless of probable cause); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 , 224–27, 229, 233–36 (1973) (referring repeatedly to
the doctrine of a search incident to “a lawful arrest” or noting that arrest in the case was “lawful” and
authorized by local statute).
312. 553 U.S. at 177–78.

DAVIES_PROOF_2.DOC

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:30:17 PM

ADOPTION OF THE BARE-PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD

65

level that the Fourth Amendment requires.”313 After Moore, police can make a
constitutional search incident to an unlawful arrest!314
Although Moore might appear to simply reflect the justices’ response to a
potentially confusing issue of state arrest law,315 it seems highly unlikely that its
holding will be confined to that setting. Rather, Moore seems to mean that
police have constitutional authority to make a warrantless arrest and an
incidental search whenever they have information indicating a fair probability
that even the most trivial misdemeanor offense has been committed, regardless
of any restrictions state law places on making arrests for that offense. By
implication Moore means that the “in the presence” restriction on warrantless
misdemeanor arrests no longer matters for assessing the constitutionality of a
warrantless arrest, or of a search made incident thereto, even though that is still
a statutory requirement for a lawful warrantless misdemeanor arrest in most
states.316 Bizarrely, it seems that state law defines the existence of an offense,
and also provides the lawful authority for state officers to enforce the offense,
but that only the former, and not the latter, matters for Fourth Amendment
analysis.317
Moore opens the way for extravagant assertions of police arrest and search
power. For example, Moore allows police to make a constitutional search
incident to an arrest for a minor traffic violation for which they are authorized
by law only to issue a ticket.318 That arrest and search power is significant,
moreover, because the Justices have previously held that police are also entitled
to stop a car for a traffic violation as a pretext for investigating the possibility of
other crime.319 Indeed, it would appear that police can even make a

313. Id. at 171.
314. In Carroll, the justices invented the automobile-search exception to the warrant requirement
precisely because they recognized that a search-incident-to-arrest could be based only on a lawful
arrest, and a lawful arrest could not be made in the circumstances. See supra notes 245–50 and
accompanying text. But in keeping with the judicial tendency to hide departures from prior rulings,
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Moore never mentions Carroll, let alone acknowledge the contrary analysis
in that case.
315. The offense observed in Moore would have been arrestable in some counties of Virginia, but
was not in the county in which Moore was actually arrested. See 553 U.S. at 167.
316. At least that was still the case in 2002. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 3, at 386 n.499.
317. Or perhaps the Court will tell us in a future case that there need not actually even be a legally
defined offense, but only a “fair probability” that there could be such an offense. For example, if
American jurisdictions typically make particular conduct an offense, perhaps it will not matter whether
the jurisdiction in which an arrest or search is made actually defines the conduct to be an offense
because there was a “fair probability” that it might have been an offense.
318. The Court had previously ruled that issuance of a traffic ticket cannot justify a search. See
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). That ruling now appears to be irrelevant for purposes of applying
the Fourth Amendment because an officer can make an illegal arrest for a traffic stop and conduct a
constitutional search incident to that illegal arrest.
319. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The allowance of pretextual stops for traffic
offenses in Whren may also have taken on increased importance as a result of the unanimous decision
in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), which authorized police to make “inquiries into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . so long as those inquires do not measurably extend
the duration of the stop.” Id. at 788. It remains to be seen what “measurably” will mean.
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constitutional but illegal arrest and incident search based merely on a
confidential informant’s tip that there is a fair probability that a person had
driven without a seat-belt on some previous occasion!
Justice Scalia’s treatment of history in Moore is also noteworthy. Rather
than attempt the impossible task of documenting that bare probable cause had
been the framing-era standard for warrantless arrests of any kind (which it was
not), Justice Scalia—the Court’s leading “originalist”—opted for evasion.
Specifically, he evaded the historical inquiry by adopting the false posture that
Atwater had already established that bare probable cause sufficed to justify
warrantless misdemeanor arrests at the time of the framing and declined to
discuss the point further.320 So in the Supreme Court, history is reduced to stare
decisis, and prior distortions are immune to correction regardless of the weight
of contrary evidence.
To give the appearance of engaging with history, though, Justice Scalia
decorated his evasion with gratuitous historical misstatements321 and
obfuscation. With regard to the latter, he wrote as though the issue was whether
the purported (but false) original understanding of Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness”—which Atwater had incorrectly portrayed to permit arrests
for any offenses on bare probable cause—could be limited by additional
statutory restrictions on arrest authority.322 But that formulation inverted the

320. Moore, 553 U.S. at 169 n.2.
321. In one passage in Moore, Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he immediate object of the Fourth
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that English judges had
employed against the colonists.” 553 U.S. at 168–69 (emphasis added). The italicized statement is
historically false. No English judge had any jurisdiction to do anything in the American colonies. The
litigation regarding the validity of writs of assistance occurred in the colonial courts, and many of the
colonial judges actually refused to issue writs of assistance. The colonial grievance was against the
authorization of such writs by parliamentary statutes. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 3, at
29–31. Indeed, one of the English judges, Lord Camden, was a hero to the colonists for condemning
general warrants in the English Wilkesite cases. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 3, at 586, 657–
58. I mention this because it seems highly unlikely that Justice Scalia’s misleading historical claim
merely reflects carelessness or over simplification. Rather, it dovetails too nicely with the attack on the
historical warrant requirement that Professor Amar has previously advanced; namely, that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to discourage the use of warrants because Americans viewed judges as
oppressors. See id. at 583–88. Justice Scalia and Professor Amar have previously conducted a sort of
tag-team endorsement of a purported historical “reasonableness” standard. See Davies, Correcting
History, supra note 3, at 32 n.60. So it will not be surprising if some future opinion asserting that the
Framers did not value warrants cites this passage in Moore as authority for a historical-sounding claim
that the Fourth Amendment was actually aimed at curtailing the power of judges. That is how history
by stare decisis is concocted.
322. Moore, 553 U.S. at 167–71. Citing my 1999 article and another work, Justice Scalia wrote that
“No early case or commentary, to our knowledge, suggested the Amendment was intended to
incorporate subsequently enacted statutes. None of the early Fourth Amendment cases that scholars
have identified sought to base a constitutional claim on a violation of a state or federal statute
concerning arrest.” Id. at 169. That is utterly beside the point because the constitutional provisions
were meant to restrict legislative encroachments on common-law rights. The crucial question is whether
Justice Scalia could identify any framing-era authority that permitted a search to be justified on the
ground that it was made incident to an unlawful arrest. He could not because that claim would have
been as bizarre in 1789 as it is today.
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whole purpose of the constitutional protections that address arrest standards;
they were aimed at protecting the people from expanded arrest authority, not at
enhancing government arrest power. The genuine history is that the state and
federal “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions were actually
meant to require that criminal arrests and searches be justified by more than
bare probable cause—and far more than a mere “fair probability” of criminal
activity. Indeed, even if the fictional claim about a historical Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard that Justice Scalia recited in Moore were
true, his analysis would still invert the Framers’ actual purpose. The Framers
sought to prevent legislative relaxation of common-law protections, not to
prohibit legislative reinforcement of those protections. Moore, however,
subverts the Framers’ purpose of preserving a constitutional right of personal
security while offering only statist persiflage in its stead.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The authentic history of probable cause shows that “the living Constitution”
is not a normative issue, but a historical fact. The authentic history of bare
probable cause is not a story of staunch judicial enforcement of a long-standing
historical standard. Rather, it is a story of how state and federal judges
surreptitiously engineered a massive expansion of government arrest and search
power. Thus, the purportedly originalist claims in recent Supreme Court searchand-seizure opinions do not track the real history; rather, they conceal it. The
authentic history of probable cause is the story of how Americans judges, and
particularly Supreme Court Justices, have effectively destroyed the civil right to
be free of arbitrary arrest and search.
However, the moral of the authentic story of probable cause is not to call for
a return to the historical common-law standards. Far too much has changed
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights for that. Some relaxation of the
common-law crime-in-fact requirement was surely necessary for effective law
enforcement in a complex, largely urban society. The disquieting aspect of the
authentic history of probable cause is that judges and justices have been
unwilling to own up to the changes they have made. They have repeatedly
expanded government police power while pretending to merely adhere to prior
doctrine. The fact that they have been unwilling to describe their rulings
honestly suggests that we should be very skeptical as to whether current
doctrine strikes the right balance between liberty and law enforcement—
especially because it is now difficult to identify meaningful constitutional limits
323
on police arrest and search power.

323. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The
Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2010).

